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3Abstract
The period between 1992 and 2005 was turbulent for the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA). Failed responses to Hurricanes Andrew and Katrina 
resulted in academics questioning the efficacy of FEMA’s structure and ability to 
coordinate a response. The literature studying this phenomenon focuses on whether the 
failed responses were due to FEMA’s structure being too flexible or too hierarchical. This 
thesis argues this duality misses the point. First, the literature is overly focused on failure
at the expense of success. This necessarily ignores half the story. Analysing successful 
responses will provide a more holistic view of what structures are the most appropriate in 
a response. Second, responses are never wholly open or closed but rather a mixture of 
both. FEMA’s responses need to be disaggregated into their strategic (policy-makers) and 
operational (implementers) components and their combinations examined. With reference 
to two failures, Hurricanes Andrew and Katrina, and two successes, The Great Midwest 
Floods and Northridge Earthquake, this thesis argues optimal response frameworks are 
strategically closed and operationally open. 
This work is substantially my own, and where any part of this work is not my own, I have indicated this by 
acknowledging the source of that part or those parts of the work.
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6Thunder on the mountain heavy as can be; 
Mean old twister bearing down on me;
All the ladies in Washington scrambling to get out of town;
Looks like something bad gonna happen, better roll your 
airplane down;
Thunder on the Mountain – Bob Dylan
7Chapter One – Introduction
You Always Take The Weather With You
In the wake of Hurricane Katrina in 2005 and the catastrophic consequences 
exacerbated by the bungled government relief effort, The Federal Emergency 
Management Agency’s (FEMA) bureaucratic structure was thrust into the political and 
academic spotlight. Every sitting member, newspaper editor and scholar had an opinion 
about whether or not FEMA should be disbanded (Senator Collins, Senate Hearing, 2006), 
reconstructed (Roberts 2006) or as President George W. Bush stated, consolidated into 
the Department of Defence (Bush 2005). At the core of each of these actions lie 
assumptions about the optimal methods FEMA should implement to better respond to
disasters. 
FEMA is an exemplary case study because its mission and structure have been 
manipulated over the past fifteen years as Presidential priorities have changed.1 Bush’s 
comments mirrored Clinton’s call for reorganization fifteen years earlier after the failed 
response to Hurricane Andrew (Frontline 2005). These failures are overwhelmingly 
represented in the literature. However, these two major events – Hurricanes Andrew 
(August 1992) and Katrina (August 2005) – bracket a period of time where the 
organization was able to respond effectively – and with much less attention – to disasters. 
Material analysing the interim remains relatively scant. I seek to examine the evolution 
(devolution?) of FEMA in the fifteen years between these two disasters. Under the 
                                                
1 For example, up until 1992, FEMA was primarily charged with civil defence against a nuclear attack, 
from 1993-2003 its mission was to prepare for, and respond to, disasters, and from 2003 it was responsible 
for defending against domestic terrorist threats. Furthermore, in that time the structure of FEMA changed 
from a small agency, to a Cabinet level agency and then finally into a sub-section of the DHS. (See Roberts 
2006).
8guidance of Director James Lee Witt, FEMA became an efficient and respected 
department and its responses to the Great Midwest Floods in 1993 and Northridge 
Earthquake in 1994 were exemplary (Nigg, 1997; Comfort 1994). This period was one of 
unprecedented success for FEMA and yet it received comparatively little attention in the 
literature. A temporal analysis of FEMA’s responses, both failures and successes, 
between 1992 and 2005 has not been attempted. 
Disaster management literature is divided into two fundamental camps: those that 
promote “open” systems and those that advocate “closed” systems. This partition is due 
to the different styles and characteristics of management that responders implement
during a crisis. Open systems are characterised as being flexible, and involve local 
communities. They generally have a plan that is able to be adapted according to the 
context, capacities, and geography. Closed systems on the other hand are based on 
procedures and hierarchy. Each possible problem is “anticipated” with a contingency plan 
from which there is little deviation. 
I argue that the binary application of these frameworks is flawed. Firstly, 
academics who write about open and closed systems with regards to disasters or 
successes often attempt to categorise the response as either open or closed. 
Categorisations of whole responses as either open or closed are missing the point. I will 
demonstrate that in order to provide a more in-depth and thorough analysis, responses 
need to be further disaggregated into the strategic (policy-creation) and operational (local)
components.
As responses are both open and closed, it is safe to assert that a combination of 
open and closed, at both strategic and operational levels, is required. This distinction is 
9often missed within the literature. Instead, there is a marked bias towards open systems 
and their apparent appropriateness in every disaster. Closed systems, on the other hand, 
are subject to unwarranted criticism for being prone to failure. I argue that strategic actors 
are, other than in very specific exceptions, always closed and only prone to failure 
because of potential political pressures, such as scapegoating and blame. 
Disaggregating responses into their respective operational and strategic parts, and 
then determining whether or not they are open or closed, is a better method to use to 
order to analyse their effectiveness than viewing them in isolation. This division allows 
for an overview of bottom-up and top-down responders. Strategic actors, those working 
from the top-down, constitute the upper echelons of decision-making and policy-creation. 
Actors in this layer are responsible for “setting the parameters for implementation” (‘t 
hart et al 1993:30) and remain at a distance from the crisis, taking a hands-on, but largely 
supportive role. Operational units, on the other hand, are the implementers, largely local 
personnel, who are, by the virtue of being at the scene, active participants in the technical 
aspects of a response.
This paper focuses on the distinct roles of strategic and operational actors and 
demonstrates both units have the potential to contribute distinctly to the success or failure 
of disaster management. Along with the need to compare successes and failures, it is also 
vital to assess the failures of strategic units through a strategic lens and seek to reform 
them into more effective units for their supportive and policy-making roles. In doing so, 
strategic units may need to maintain some approximation of a “closed” system because 
they are necessarily subject to political and bureaucratic hierarchies. Operational units, 
the preferred framework for response in disaster management literature, require similar 
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focussed attention. A more thorough understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of 
operational structures will be useful to demonstrate where flexibility is needed and how 
better to empower local communities who are, by definition, the first to respond to the 
disaster. 
A Model Responder (Strategic Closed/Operational Open)
Disaster Response
Strategic and operational actors can be either open or closed, depending on what 
function they wish to achieve. I argue that disasters offer some universal problems as 
well as contextual ones. There are usually communications problems in disaster areas. In 
all four case studies the disaster was large enough to damage phone-lines and mobile 
towers. This factor causes two distinct problems: strategic actors are unable to 
communicate missions and roles to operational units and operational units are unable to 
request supplies and assistance from strategic actors. Contextual problems, such as debris 
blocking access routes into a disaster area, present different problems, and require
flexibility to adapt to conditions.
With these factors in mind, I argue that there is the combination of closed 
strategic and open operational units addresses problems in responses most effectively. At 
the strategic level, it combines hierarchical leadership, to delegate responsibilities, with a 
reliance on conventions to assist with the processing of requests whereas flexibility and 
adaptability are encouraged in independent units at the operational level. In this thesis, I 
examine the operational and strategic levels and open and closed frameworks in four case 
studies, as demonstrated in Table 1.1, to discern why strategically open/operationally 
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closed frameworks fail, and strategically closed/operational open frameworks elicit
successful responses.
Table 1.1
Operational Strategic
Open
Midwest (S)
Northridge (S)
Andrew (F)
Katrina (F)
Closed
Katrina (F)
Andrew (F)
Midwest (S)
Northridge (S)
Outline
This thesis is divided into six chapters. Chapter One provides an overview of open, 
closed, strategic and operational theories, and presents an exemplary framework. Chapter 
Two sets out the methods for this thesis, focusing on why the literature ignores successes. 
Chapter Three provides a review of the open and closed literature and purports that 
operational and strategic levels need attention. Chapter Four examines the effect of the 
strategically open and operationally closed framework on FEMA’s responses to 
Hurricanes Andrew and Katrina. Chapter Five examines the strategically closed and 
operationally open framework’s effect on The Great Midwest Floods and Northridge 
Earthquake. Finally, Chapter Six presents conclusions and areas for future research.  
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Chapter Two: Out of Focus – Case Study Selection
Introduction
Case study selection is an important factor in a comparative study.  There are 
three reasons why these four disasters and FEMA are the central examples in this thesis. 
First, focusing on the peak disaster management, FEMA negates some of the problems 
with the “fractal effect”. Second, although a multitude of studies about the responses to 
Andrew and Katrina have attributed failure to communication and leadership, a structural 
analysis has not been attempted. Finally, successes, like the Great Midwest Floods and 
Northridge are largely ignored in the literature because they are not “catastrophic”. I 
argue The Great Midwest Floods and Northridge are not garden variety disasters. In fact, 
they are the largest and most damaging disasters of their type and yet they elicited a 
successful response. Examining these successes reveals how FEMA was able to modify 
its practices so quickly after Andrew.
The Fractal Effect:
Strategic and operational structures are persistent throughout disaster management 
hierarchies. It would be incorrect to assert that there are clearly defined boundaries to 
where strategic actors end and operational actors begin. The major problem is one that I 
have deemed the “Fractal Effect”. Fractals are a mathematical phenomenon whereby a 
“rough geometrical shape can be subdivided into parts that are…a copy of the original 
shape” (Falconer 2003:27-28). Fractals are also irregular and unique, just like individual 
organizations. Most importantly fractals remain similar “at any level of magnification” 
(Falconer 2003:28). In government terms this translates to regardless of how far up or 
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down the hierarchy the analysis focuses on, the structure will remain comparable 
(individual organizational differences notwithstanding). 
In each organization there is a (individually defined) level of centralization in 
order to provide a clearer accountability schematic and to increase the efficacy of the 
delegation of responsibilities. This occurs in strategic organizations, such as those in the 
Federal sphere such as FEMA, and in operational or “first responder” units like the police 
and non-governmental organizations. There are undoubtedly leaders and followers, 
however that is merely a cross section of (any point of) the disaster management 
hierarchy. In order for any analysis to be useful, limits need to be placed on the scope of 
what is and what is not operational and strategic.
This paper examines the efficacy of disaster management in the United States. As 
such the scope of the strategic and operational elements needs to relate to the peak bodies 
of crisis management, namely, FEMA and its subsidiary agents. Federal organizations, 
such as FEMA, its Cabinet position under Clinton, and the Armed Forces, provide the 
basis for the strategic strata. The operational level of analysis is focused on the units 
being coordinated by the strategic bodies. These groups include police, some NGOs, 
search and rescue teams, damage assessment units as well as resource-suppliers (for food, 
ice, medicines etc) and transport agents.
There are two reasons for the scope of this definition; continuity and the removal 
of obstacles. By assessing the organizations that are directly coordinated by FEMA or its 
agents on the ground in the disaster zone, the analysis gains a measure of continuity. This 
is not a study of every group, organization, and individual’s contribution to the disaster 
response but rather a means of demonstrating FEMA’s responsibilities and pointing out 
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which units FEMA believed would best coordinate, cooperate, and mobilize to create the 
most successful response possible. Organizations range from the global, such as the Red 
Cross, to the state, such as the National Guard, and the local, like the police. Each one of 
these groups is under the auspices of FEMA in the event after Major Disaster or an 
Emergency declaration. The ability to make the link between the units and their 
coordinators is vital in any analysis of the efficacy of disaster response. 
The second factor justifying this definition is that it reduces the obstacles clouding 
the relationship between FEMA as a strategic coordinator and its operational subsidiaries. 
Defining the actors this way restricts the amount of strategic and operational units in the 
disaster management spectrum. Any wider analysis would be hampered by individual 
responses and community groups. While these are a part of the response, they are more 
self-sufficient and are part of the “inevitable response”, the response that materializes 
from locals protecting their homes as they are threatened or damaged. If the scope is any 
narrower, just assessing FEMA for example, then the operational arm of the organization 
and its coordinating abilities is ignored. The organization’s role is to provide a central 
point for disaster response. Any analysis not only needs to take its organizational capacity 
into account, but also its ability to provide assistance through its subsidiary, “second tier” 
agents. This provides the opportunity to analyse the effect of FEMA’s position, mission, 
role, and leadership on both strategic and operational units simultaneously, rather than 
attempt to examine them in a vacuum.     
Under-Representation of Successes 
Academics set the debate over disaster management in the context of isolated, 
albeit in-depth, studies of specific disasters. A plethora of studies add to the argument 
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that open systems are better at responding to disasters than their closed counterparts. This 
is empirically consistent with reference to the isolated examples of Andrew and Katrina 
where the failed responses could have been mitigated had FEMA been more “auto-
adaptive” in its approach (Roberts 2006). It is useful to put the recommendations made 
following these failures in the context of successes to test their validity. Under Lee Witt, 
FEMA successfully responded to the United States’ most costly flood (Great Midwest 
Flood from May 1993 to January 1994) and earthquake (Northridge Earthquake in 
January 1994) which occurred only a year after Andrew (Roberts 2005; Schneider 1995; 
Kweit and Kweit, 2006). Therefore, it is not just singular responses that must be analysed. 
The effects of changes to organizations’ missions and leadership are made more overt in 
an analysis of the over-arching context in which the disasters and FEMA are placed.
There is a marked bias in the literature towards writing about “what went wrong”. 
Academics such as Moynihan (2006), Brinkley (2007), and Kweit and Kweit (2006), 
concentrate on fundamental aspects such as communication and coordination in an 
attempt to promote a view about FEMA as either incompetent, needing reform, or in line 
for abolition. However, concurrently, there is a dearth of stories about “what went right”. 
One possible reason why academics and politicians assert that FEMA was untested 
during Lee Witt’s reign as Director (Brinkley 2007; Roberts 2006) could be that there 
simply is not the same amount of information about and analyses of, successful responses 
as there are for failed ones. Instead, there appears to be a consensus that FEMA can 
respond adequately to “garden variety” disasters because its massive bureaucracy is able 
to mobilize. However, in a catastrophic disaster it would be (and has been) swept aside in 
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favour of an individual actor at the scene, for example, Secretary Card during Hurricane 
Andrew. 
There are two reasons for the lack of studies focusing on successes; the media, 
and a preference for recommendations. It is unsurprising that PBS Frontline 
correspondent. Jeffrey Brown described the coverage of Katrina as “the worst week of 
reporting in the history of American media” (Smith 2005). The media’s preoccupation 
with showing the horror of disasters, as opposed to the relief effort, has a significant 
impact on whether a disaster is deemed a “success” or a “failure”. During Katrina, the 
chaotic response was overshadowed by (largely exaggerated) allusions to looting, mass 
rapes in the Superdome, and gangs murdering citizens indiscriminately (Brinkley, 2007). 
Disasters, like Northridge, affect a smaller population and do not provide the same 
sensational news images as a hurricane, nor do the Great Midwest Floods, which were
drawn out over the course of nine months. While discussions about the media’s ability to 
shape the truth lie outside this paper, it is important to emphasis is power to define what 
successful and failed responses are.
The second element is the trend towards analysing disastrous responses so as to 
provide recommendations to avoid future mistakes. In-depth studies are useful for 
exploring what went wrong, but they lack the ability to draw from (failed and successful) 
events from a wider timeframe. This is not a wholly selfish motive, however, academics 
such as Moynihan (2006) and Morris (2006) are perfect examples of in-depth studies of 
disasters whose conclusions lack analytical comparisons with successes. The lack of data 
and investigation into successes perpetuates this cycle. This paper aims to rectify a small 
part of this discrepancy by scrutinizing failures and successes over a thirteen year 
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timeframe from 1992 to 2005. This comparison will bring new light to any claims about 
the strengths and weaknesses of the United States’ premier disaster relief agency, FEMA. 
Disastrous responses are still vital in order to figure out why mistakes were made 
and whether it was the fault of systemic or contextual factors. Avoiding or ignoring them 
would be unhelpful. This paper compares both because labelling a response a “failure” or 
a “success” is often times a misnomer: there are elements of both in all disasters. By 
teasing out the variables between the two labels, the two structures, and the two levels, it 
will become clearer which is the most effective framework and will provide a more 
holistic overview of what it is to be defined as a success or failure. 
Garden Variety Disasters
A main element in debates over FEMA’s effectiveness in the period from 1992-
2005 is the charge that there were no “catastrophic disasters” only those that could only 
be described as “garden variety” (Schneider 1995:134). With this in mind it is worth 
examining the extent of disaster occurrences in the United States between those two dates, 
and how they are classified. 
The United States is no stranger to disasters. Each year there are hundreds of 
disasters of which tens are determined (by a Presidential declaration) to be “catastrophic” 
or a “major emergency” (FEMA 2007). However, it is not enough to use the Presidential 
declaration as a guideline for the severity and magnitude of disasters. Warnesley et al 
(1996) point out that disaster relief is inherently political insofar as regions that are 
granted funding often use them towards projects that benefit the community and are able 
to be used as political pork-barrelling. President Clinton set the benchmark for 
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declarations and remains the President with the most declared disasters in his term, 
including large snow storms for the first time (Franklin 1995). 
There were hundreds of disasters of, major, catastrophic, and garden, variety, 
between 1992 and 2005 (FEMA, 2007a). Academics project their own definition of 
catastrophic onto their work (see: Moynihan (2006) and Morris (2006) for example). 
However, the classification “catastrophic” is only useful to a point. The very political 
nature of disaster response makes any reliance on Presidential Declarations as a guide for 
what is and is not catastrophic inherently political as well. Beyond the arguments over the 
classification of catastrophic, major, and garden variety disasters lies a potential solution: 
perhaps FEMA was tested with catastrophic and major disasters, but there is a lack of 
discussion on the subject because there were no catastrophic or major failures. 
Catastrophic disasters often have two elements; a natural element brought about from the 
actual impact of the disaster and a systemic element, brought on by coordination, 
cooperation, and logistical problems when FEMA is mobilized. 
The political nature of disasters makes any kind of declaration a poor, and 
ultimately subjective, criterion for disaster categorization. Equally, it is unhelpful to 
argue, as Schneider does, that there are no “garden variety” disasters because it is always 
catastrophic for someone (1995:134). Clearly, if garden variety is defined as “common” 
or “standard” then such disasters exist: earthquakes and bush fires in California, 
hurricanes in Florida, and tornados throughout the Midwest. While these types of disaster 
may be expected, the context, geography, and intensity of each can move it away from 
general understandings of what it is to be “garden variety”. The four case studies in this 
paper are not “garden variety” disasters. The size, damage, and personnel deployment of 
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each disaster rank them as the some of the most dangerous and damaging disasters of 
their kind
Classifying Catastrophe
FEMA failing is not sufficient enough to classify a disaster outright. This is why 
studying successes is vital. In this paper I have added Northridge and the Great Midwest 
Floods to the analysis of FEMA’s efficacy. These incidents are important, and disastrous, 
in their own right. Northridge is important because it signals the first time Federal Armed 
Forces (as opposed to the National Guard) were officially deployed using the Federal 
Response Plan after a disaster (Comfort 1994). Moreover, it was the first successful 
martial deployment, paving the way for the military to become a key player in domestic 
disaster management. Lee Witt’s ability to coordinate federal, state, and local actors is a 
testament to his ability to mobilize resources and recognize when he is needed and when 
he is not. Stickney, Card, and Brown lacked this quality. They either believed the disaster 
response would collapse without them (Card in Andrew), or that the response would 
work perfectly without them (Stickney in Andrew, Brown in Katrina)2.
Catastrophic disasters are likely to have more than one dimension. Dimension in 
this case means a disaster-within-a-disaster, for example, flooding after a hurricane, mass 
power and water shortages after earthquakes, or forced isolationism due to road closures 
                                                
2 I acknowledge that two successful hurricane responses would have strengthened my argument. My view 
is that the multidimensionality (wind/water/infrastructure damage) of catastrophic disasters, while almost 
always present in hurricanes, can be present in other disasters. In fact, the very fact that 
multidimensionality is rare in floods and earthquakes makes an analysis of an agency’s ability to respond to 
them even more important, as it demonstrates the agency’s ability to adapt to factors that are uncommon. 
Equally, Andrew was arguably a uni-dimensional disaster: instead of the flood and wind damage that was 
seen in New Orleans, South Floridians were largely only affected by wind damage. Taking into 
consideration that flooding means not only infrastructural damage such as would be found after damaging 
winds, but also access and transportation isolation, I find the comparison between earthquakes, hurricanes, 
and floods to be compelling and useful.  
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and transport damage. These dimensions complement factors such as housing and 
infrastructure destruction which is common in all four case studies. Identifying 
dimensions within disasters makes it easier to approach disaster classification with more 
objective criteria. In this paper I propose six (certainly not exhaustive) guidelines to 
provide a more holistic analysis of disasters which I call the six “Ds”: size of disaster 
area; buildings destroyed; displaced persons; dollars of damage, deaths, and troop 
deployment (see Table 2.1). With these guidelines I hope to disturb the assumption in the 
literature that catastrophe is merely magnitude. In fact, magnitude, and by association 
catastrophe is more than just dollars and deaths.
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Table 2.1 Graph of Damage
Hurricane 
Andrew
1992
Great 
Midwest 
Flood
1993
Northridge 
Earthquake
1994
Hurricane 
Katrina
2005
Buildings 
Destroyed:
126,000
9,000 
caravans
47650
12500 (severe)
1000 (knocked 
down)
205,000
Disaster Area: 
(sq mi)
300 320,000
Damage 
recorded 77 
miles from 
epicentre
90,000
Displaced 
Persons:
160,000-
300,000
74000 20000
Up to 
1,000,000
Damage Costs: 
(Billions)
26.5 15 12.5-20 84
Deaths: 26-44 50 72 1836
Troop 
Deployment:
7000 
National 
Guard
22000 
Military 
19 Generals
3000-9000 
Army Corps 
of Engineers
Five ACE 
Districts
1500 National 
Guard
58500 
National 
Guard
22000 
Military
Conclusion
Hurricane Andrew, the Great Midwest Floods, Northridge Earthquake, and
Hurricane Katrina are four of the most devastating disasters in U.S. history. These four 
disasters selected to give an equal account of successes and failures. The over-
representation of failures and incorrect categorization of successes as “garden variety” 
makes this balance all the more important. Focusing on failures alone misses half of a 
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very important question: what is the most effective method of responding to a disaster? 
Analysing what combination of open, closed, operational, and strategic was evident 
within the two successes and two disasters will provide a more holistic view of what 
framework is the most effective during a response.     
23
Chapter Three: Literature Review and Contribution
Introduction
Advocates of both open and closed frameworks contend that they each overcome 
the shortcomings of the other. The open framework provides a level of flexibility that is 
absent in closed, yet the closed hierarchical structure is better suited to more efficient 
communication and rule-following. Before any addition to the frameworks is proposed, 
an examination of the strengths and weaknesses of “open” and “closed” is required. I will 
demonstrate why this division is inappropriate because of the structure of disaster 
management. Also, I propose that disaggregation into strategic and operational levels is 
needed and propose criteria which can be used to define efficacy. Finally, the various 
permutations of the new framework e.g. open/operational or closed/strategic will be 
examined in order to demonstrate which is the most appropriate. 
Table 3.1 – Comparison of Open and Closed
Open Closed
Structure
Horizontal integration of individual 
units with a common goal
Vertical integration of command and 
control mechanisms
Function
As a pluralistic, individualistic, 
flexible set of units
Concentrate decision making 
responsibilities towards the executive
Assumptions 
of disaster
When confusion occurs, locals are 
best to intervene.
Chaos needs an artificial body with 
ability to command and control
Operational 
Risks
Jurisdictional Overlap
Reliant on outside resources
Variable experience and leadership
Input overload at executive level
Incompetence of executives
“Break in the chain”
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Open
Introduction
Open units are pluralistic actors who are horizontally integrated and united by 
common goals. While plans are important, the most crucial factor is the ability to be 
flexible and improvise. The majority of studies analysing structures in disaster response 
conclude that relatively decentralized local/operational units are more useful than
FEMA’s current hierarchical, centralized structure (Schneider 1990; 2005, Sylves 1994; 
Roberts 2006; Kweit and Kweit 2006). Scavo et al (2006) and Sobel and Leeson (2006) 
argue that decentralized units are (amongst other things) flexible and effective with their 
resources to a greater extent and that this “effectiveness” is derived from diffusing 
responsibility and accountability. Furthermore they argue that more rigid hierarchies 
necessitate a focus on “efficiency” which (ironically) often leads to misallocation (Scavo 
et al 2006:16, Sobel and Leeson 2006:66). 
Advantages
Open systems are often perceived as being more effective because they are more 
flexible. Open systems’ opponents assume there will be confusion in the disaster. Instead 
of installing an “artificial body”3, such as the army or FEMA, open advocates maintain 
that the current social structure is adequate to deal with the situation because of their 
ability to improvise and adapt. For example, after Hurricane Andrew local responders 
used their mobiles and satellite phones in an attempt to find new methods of 
                                                
3 ‘t Hart et al define a “disaster” as being the overwhelming of local and state levels of government (‘t Hart 
et al. 1993:17). In this regard, an “artificial” body is a ‘foreign’ entity that is required, be it requested or 
otherwise, to deploy in an irregular context such as FEMA or the Army.
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communication when the phone-lines were destroyed (Madigan 1994). They were able to 
achieve this by using a more “pluralistic and disaggregated” model, which involves the 
“horizontal integration” of non-governmental organizations as well as local agencies.
Disadvantages
Although pluralistic units are useful to disperse across a large disaster area there 
are also two significant problems. First, purely decentralized systems, each with its own 
communication networks, plans and leaders risks overlapping jurisdictions and being 
overwhelmed. Second, the added structural variability between open units means that 
communicating orders can be difficult. If there are multiple decision-makers this can lead 
to confusion, overlap, and duplication.
Closed
Introduction
Those arguing for a more “closed” system contend that mitigating chaos through 
command and control should be the primary objective for first responders. Closed 
systems rely on hierarchy to provide the most effective means of communication and 
compliance. They are generally more rigid with plans, substituting flexibility for 
procedures and protocols.
Advantages
Closed systems have the advantage of vertical hierarchy which encourages 
compliance. Each level is given a role to fulfil and specific protocols to follow. The 
system is based on “anticipation” (Wildavsky 1988) in order to provide procedures for 
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every contingency. This structure allows for a more effective transfer of information 
about procedures to different actors provided that there is no break in the chain of 
command.
Disadvantages
Dynes (1994; 2000) and Moynihan (2006) argue that “closed” or “military” 
systems are less effective because they are unable to adapt to “spontaneous, unplanned 
events”. Further, the closed systems see power as “uni-dimensional in emergencies” 
when in reality a power is distributed among many separate agencies and organizations 
(Dynes 1994:149). 
Concurrently Harrald argues that to give more power to centralized systems, 
legislators must concede that the most important aspect of disaster response is discipline 
in both law and order and operational contexts. Furthermore he states that ultimately the 
aim of the two streams in the disaster response literature (“agility, flexibility and 
creativity” on the one hand and discipline on the other) should be convergence (Harrald 
2006:256). Although Harrald’s analysis is useful as a discussion of collaboration and 
coordination prospects, his view that convergence is possible, as long as it does not 
involve more centralization is inconclusive and logically inconsistent. His argument 
assumes open systems are more effective when responding to crises because they have 
avenues for feedback. Firstly, he makes this claim without having compared the 
operational effectiveness of opened and closed systems. More importantly, closed units, 
such as the Army or Fire Department, are far more likely to have more uniform and 
broader oversight mechanisms than open structures. This is because these units have both 
the organizational resources (as defined by a culture of accountability) to both initiate 
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such a process, and implement any recommendations. On the other hand, the 
effectiveness of feedback in open units is variable at best. 
Discussions on (limiting) centralization are marred by an error of focus: 
academics are prone to conflating “operational” centralization (at a local level) with its 
“strategic” counterpart (at a departmental level). Both Moynihan (2006) and Roberts 
(2005; 2006) equate failure with the rigidity of (FEMA’s) hierarchical structures in their 
studies. While these studies come to the same conclusion, they are actually talking about 
different aspects of centralization. Moynihan focuses on strategic centralization: decision-
making being concentrated towards the higher levels of government. On the other hand, 
Roberts alludes to centralization amongst operational units: decision-making being 
concentrated towards the higher levels of local groups such as the police, hospital staff or 
the Red Cross.
The Structure of Disaster Management:
Although some academics have begun to accept that more organized “closed” or 
“centralized” systems could guard against future “Katrinas”, a sizeable majority 
maintains its focus on FEMA becoming completely “open” or “decentralized” (for 
example, Moynihan 2006; Sobel and Leeson 2006). If, as Kapucu and Van Wart argue, 
“structure does matter” (2006:304) then further research needs to grapple with the gap in 
the literature by teasing out whether the benefits of centralization are greater at a strategic 
or operational level. I argue there is also potentially a “third way”. It is possible that 
improving communication and flows of information is as important as the bureaucratic 
system. Helco argues that building trust is the most integral facet of improving 
communication (Helco 1974: 303). Significant reorganizations of bureaucratic structures 
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(be it at a strategic or operational level) have the potential to undermine any gains by de-
coupling or complicating pre-existing missions.
The Criteria 
Analyses of strategic and operational units each require a different rubric. I 
examine the different constitutions of these units with reference to their mission, position 
in the disaster, autonomy, access to superiors, leadership, and role. Although these 
elements are contextual an examination of their definitions and functions is needed.
Mission
Dominant and subsidiary missions dictate how malleable organizations are under 
pressure and what tasks they are most likely to perform successfully. Within each 
organization there is at least one mission, that is, “a persistent, patterned way of thinking” 
(Wilson 1989:91). Platt (1999) and Moore (2001) argue that in a crisis, if an organization 
attempts a task they are not familiar with they are likely to “contribute to the very 
disaster...they are intended to relieve” (Platt 1999:37). These studies are useful to explain 
individual disaster responses. 
An organization’s mission is the most important factor when exploring its primary 
function. How it sees its own objectives provides as a window to priorities and conflicts 
within the organization. FEMA is an important example – its mission has been modified 
on a number of occasions and each time the agency has needed to coordinate a response 
quickly afterwards. The success or failure of these operations may be due to how FEMA 
views its position in the disaster response matrix. The expectant norms - how state and 
local governments expect federal agencies to act – are vital when designing and 
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implementing disaster response policy because they need to aware of what assistance is 
mandated, implied or absent in a Federal plan.
The concept of “multiple missions” (Wilson, 1989:95) existing within 
organizations serves two purposes. First it highlights how selective attention can create 
an environment where threats to a dominant mission create subordinate ones, which 
nurture mistrust and confusion. Second, it makes it possible to analyse different styles of 
leadership and their underlying assumptions. According to Harrald (2006), “closed” 
systems assume discipline is the most important facet of leadership whereas a more 
adaptable mentality is promoted in “open” systems. This is of particular interest because 
interviews with the Governor of Mississippi and Mayor of New Orleans echo the 
common view in the literature that FEMA’s disastrous response after Katrina was 
because of a “failure of leadership at all levels” (Smith 2005).What effect did FEMA’s 
mission have in causing these failings? The rigidity of hierarchy in centralized systems 
(such as DHS) versus the fluidity of networks in decentralized systems (such as FEMA 
under Lee Witt) are useful frameworks when exploring how able organizations are to 
deal with one or more missions such as disaster response and civil defence.
Autonomy
Autonomous units are given more freedom than their subsumed counterparts. 
Autonomy alludes to the amount of discretion organizations are able to wield to direct its 
own policies and objectives. This factor is affected by where the organization stands in 
the departmental hierarchy, both in the case of whether or not it sits in isolation or is 
subsumed, but also with regards to how powerful actors such as the President perceive its 
importance. Under Clinton, FEMA was allowed to design and implement its own policies 
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such as Project Impact. Under George W. Bush, FEMA was subsumed within the 
Department of Homeland Security and was restricted by its focus on terrorism.
Subsumed
The DHS reorganization was an unprecedented amalgam of agencies covering all 
aspects of government from disaster relief to chemical waste disposal. By entering into 
this bureaucracy, FEMA was forced to “downsize” its staff and its budget which some 
personnel estimate at as much as fifty-five million dollars (Lehrer, 2004). Being 
subsumed naturally reduces an organization’s standing. However there are some benefits 
in disaster management. The current Director of FEMA, David Paulison, argues that 
“being inside of Homeland Security gives us so many more tools than we had before. We 
have the border patrol [and] we have the Coast Guard right at our fingertips. All those 
resources would not be right there were we not inside Homeland Security” (CNN 2006). 
Despite this access FEMA’s ability to change its mission and to access to the President 
which were available under Lee Witt and Clinton, were rescinded. Moreover, FEMA’s 
director’s access was further compromised with the re-introduction of the pre-Andrew 
practice of “political appointments” over experienced personnel.
Access 
High
Access is how easily directors are able to communicate with superiors such as the 
President. Access is vital in disaster management: it increases the efficiency of 
information transfers in a profession that has immense time constraints. High access is 
when the leader of the organization has a direct relationship with the President. However, 
with FEMA, this needs to be clarified further, as “relationships” in the disaster 
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management sector tend to be the result of nepotism and favouritism rather than 
professionalism. The most compelling criterion for “high” access is a position in the 
President’s Cabinet. A chair in the Cabinet guarantees almost weekly meetings, the 
ability to talk directly to the President, and to attempt to balance political motivations 
with disaster processes.
Low
Low access on the other hand is the product of increasing the distance from the 
directors to more powerful superiors. With FEMA, this came when it was subsumed into 
the DHS, which stripped FEMA’s budget of millions and changed the format of its 
mission to focus more on counter-terrorism slant (Lehrer 2006). However, this is not the 
only example of FEMA being in a “low” access situation. In the aftermath of the Cold 
War, FEMA was still designed with civil defence in mind. The fact that the organization 
maintained a largely defunct mission, and that it was judged to be superfluous, meant that 
it was harder to command the ear of the President.
Leadership
The leader of an organization has discretionary abilities to influence how a 
response is coordinated. Experience and inexperience can potentially be the difference 
between success and failure because leaders must be able to pick their battles correctly. 
Although there are external factors that influence policy direction (this paper argues that 
the War on Terrorism and the Cold War are two such examples), ultimately a leader’s 
ability to recognize what problems need attention and to convince superiors is improved 
with experience. 
Experienced
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In disaster management, experience is everything. Experience in the field requires 
a leader to be not only equipped with disaster knowledge, but also to be able (and willing) 
to use it in order to reduce delays and potential paralysis. In this way, experience is 
intrinsically linked to access whereby the success of an operation relies heavily on the 
ability of a leader to gain an audience with superiors, and to convince them of a correct 
course of action. This relationship is unsurprising: Presidents generally surround 
themselves with experts who are able to provide him or her with appropriate intelligence. 
Equally, when an organization, such as FEMA, is de-valued the director’s ability to 
influence the President and make decisions on deployments is drastically reduced also.
Inexperienced
Inexperience can strike anywhere in an organization. Operational units are just as 
likely to be inexperienced as strategic. The real question is which is more likely to cause 
failure? This question is perhaps outside the scope of this paper; suffice it to say that in 
terms of strategic leadership, inexperience came in two forms; first, as a result of mass 
resignations during the merge into DHS, and secondly when the organization became 
known as a “political dumping ground” in the days when FEMA was thought to be 
incapable of “organizing a two car parade” (Franklin, 1995).
The potential impact of political appointees, and their respective experience and 
inexperience, on a response’s efficacy emphasises an important question in disaster 
management: if more successful responses have more experienced personnel, then is it 
still possible for one to fall apart with the same criteria? Moreover, what is the difference 
between when a disaster response falls apart and when there are simply no experienced 
personnel? Access and experience are key factors when attempting to unlock why relief 
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efforts fail. Further analysis of the turbulent nature of FEMA’s planning and leadership 
could explain what, how, and why these factors caused problems.
Role
An organization’s role is the overarching factor in defining how it responds. The 
role defines whether FEMA is planning to be on the front line in the response or if it will 
be placed into a more supportive, logistical role. In either case, the role must be clear. 
Clarity of mission and of role makes cooperation and coordination easier to achieve, and 
also reduces the chance of confusion. Autonomy and access directly affect roles because 
strategic autonomy is required to be able to define an organization’s mission. 
An organization’s role is a systemic and structural choice by leaders with regards 
to gearing units for a particular kind of response: active or supportive. While the role 
does not change dramatically there is obviously room for flexibility. The fact that 
organizations can be classified into operational and strategic units, and that each of these 
levels may have different leaders and different objectives, means that there will 
necessarily be a measure of both active and supportive roles.
Active
An active role places FEMA in command of the response. FEMA becomes a hub 
for elements such as information, assistance claims, communications, and tends to 
organize all aspects. An advantage of the active approach is that there is a general 
consistency with planning and equipment. Each unit is equipped with largely the same 
tools to deal with the disaster in an attempt to encourage communication and 
interoperability.
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The main disadvantage is that “active” is sometimes misconstrued to mean 
“enforcement” rather than rescue. The majority of National Guard in Andrew and 
conventional military units in Katrina were deployed with a mission to restore “law and 
order” rather than distribution of supplies or search and rescue. The inclusion of an 
artificial body, such as the military or FEMA officials, has the potential to provoke 
overkill in a situation. It is widely reported that not only were “looting” and crime 
numbers grossly exaggerated, but also that the looting was not a factor of opportunism, 
but rather a cry of desperation about the lack of resources.
Supportive
A supportive role is one that augments, rather than overtakes, the response. From 
an operational perspective, this role concedes (or believes) that an artificial body with the 
ability to deploy more ground units does not necessarily equate to a more successful 
response. Instead, the familiarity with the area and locals make operational units more 
appropriate responders. As was seen during the Great Midwest Floods FEMA remained 
in a supportive role unless a town was overwhelmed, in which case it was able to provide 
supplies and transportation quickly. This role allowed FEMA to pick its battles, rather 
than attempt to be everyone’s everything, everywhere.
Synthesis or Division?
The struggle for a balance between the open and closed structures points out a 
question that has remained largely unanswered: what combination of frameworks should 
organizations rely on in order to increase its effectiveness in a crisis? Where is hierarchy 
more important than networking (and vice versa)? With this in mind, the structure of an 
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organization should not be categorized as absolutes, that is, as either solely “open” or 
“closed”, but instead acknowledge that the different permutations/nuances within distinct 
decision-making groups. 
 Table 3.3 – Comparison of Operational and Strategic
Strategic
Introduction:
Strategic actors inhabit the upper echelons of organizations. This level comprises 
of senior decision-makers and policy advisors who are in charge of, and hopefully 
responsible for, their operational counterparts. A minister of parliament, for example, 
provides guidelines for what policies public servants are designing and is held 
accountable for the actions of those public servants. The implication is that the most 
effective way of distinguishing the actors is from the perspective of a hierarchy. Strategic 
Operational Strategic
Personnel
Front Line Responders, Policy 
implementers, Field Agents
Top-level decision-makers, policy 
advisors, Senior staff
Function
Decisions on technical issues and 
details of implementation.
Set parameters for implementation 
Coordinate heads of operational units 
and long term policy
Position in a 
disaster
Local presence, front line, field 
agent
Geographically distant from crisis
Potential 
risks/Systemic 
Flaws
Fragmentation
Jurisdictional Overlap
Time pressure more visible
Strategic evasion
Paralysis
Input overload
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actors generally have discretionary abilities to define operational objectives. If multiple 
strategic actors are involved duplication, overlap, and confusion occur.
Personnel
Strategic personnel are leaders who design the plan or method that will be used to 
achieve a specific goal. ‘t Hart, et al argue that strategic elements function to set 
parameters for implementation (1993: 20). FEMA’s Directors, Secretary Card, and 
Mayor Nagin are example of strategic actors in disasters. They were all responsible to 
shape the overall response and leave the technical details to operational units. For 
example, FEMA provides search and rescue teams, electric generators, food and water, 
but leaves the distribution to operational actors such as the Army and NGOs.
Position in a Disaster
Given that strategic actors are responsible for providing an overview of a crisis 
(where supplies are needed, what troops are required, which sections of the city should be 
given priority), it is unsurprising that some level of geographic distance from a disaster is 
needed. The distance from a crisis supposedly allows strategic actors to be able to take 
more long-term concerns into consideration: while operational units are focused on 
getting water to citizens or evacuations, strategic actors aim to provide logistical support, 
helicopters and trucks for example, to better aid those on the front-line. As will be 
discussed, the major problems arise from a mixture of information and request overload
which results in indecision, duplication, and paralysis.
Open Strategic
Strategically open units are rare. They include three elements: diffuse decision-
making abilities, flexibility in planning, and a lack of effective veto. Decision-making in 
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open structures is naturally dispersed so as to increase an actor’s ability to create plans 
that suit distinct locations and situations. It also means that there is an increased emphasis 
on flexibility in planning whereby more contingencies are brought forth allowing for 
more chances of success if a previous plan should fail. Finally, the reduction in, or lack of, 
vetos is necessary to avoid actors from exerting too much influence on other units.
Problems arise with this structure because it is difficult to guarantee consistency 
of both mission and ability across all actors. Andrew and Katrina are examples where 
multiple actors with different strengths and weaknesses attempted to command the entire 
response instead of delegating responsibilities. On their own, each actor lacked the 
authority to overrule other strategic actors’ proposals. Consequently there were three 
different strategic responses, with three different missions, and three different actors 
which caused delays and confusion.   
Examples of this system are difficult to operationalize due to the fact that few 
organizations maintain procedures where there are no superiors, and accountability is not 
considered to be of primary importance. The purest examples I can present are terrorist 
cells. Cells can work independently from one another, have back-up plans or secondary 
targets when attacks initially fail, and are not subject to hierarchical vetos such as those in 
the military. Although individual examples are difficult to manifest, I argue that 
strategically open frameworks materialize when there are multiple strategic actors with 
multiple missions and objectives. Compelling examples exist within the disaster response 
literature in the strategic levels in the responses to Andrew and Katrina. In both cases, 
even though three closed actors were involved, the overall framework is open.
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Closed Strategic
Strategically closed structures are more abundant than their open counterparts. 
One reason for this is that closed strategic units are vertically integrated which makes 
conveying orders much more efficient than if it were horizontal. Strategically closed 
organizations have an increased focus on accountability, command and control, and 
combating chaos with an artificial body. One of the most active strategically closed actors 
in disaster responses is the Armed Forces. Generals at the strategic level are able to use 
the vertical hierarchy to communicate orders, objectives, and missions to troops in the 
disaster zone. Providing that there is not an excessive amount of flexibility needed, or 
that contingencies are mapped out, closed units are the most effective at the strategic 
level.
The strategically closed structure is vulnerable to paralysis if there is inexperience 
or input overload. Experienced leaders, who are aware of what is needed to be done, are 
more likely to influence success than inexperience personnel who delay the process to 
work out contingencies. Paralysis can also occur if operational units are overwhelmed 
and inexperienced leaders are forced to manage both strategic and technical concerns at 
the same time.
Operational
Introduction
Operational units are the front-line troops of disaster management policy. FEMA 
describes these units as “first responders…namely the local government's emergency 
services as well as those that help from nearby municipalities, the state and volunteer 
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agencies” (FEMA 2007b). These are the actors that are in the immediate response which 
precedes any requests for federal resources. As stated previously, the problem with 
assessing efficacy in disaster management is in attempting to grapple with the scale of 
units that are involved in the response. With this is mind this section aims to examine 
both what constitutes an operational unit as well as their characteristics.
Unlike strategic units, whose roles can change over time from active to supportive, 
operational units are almost always active. Their position, which is by definition has been 
affected by the disaster, necessitates that their mission remains solidly on actively 
implementing a disaster response. 
Position in disaster
A major variant between operational and strategic actors derives from their 
position, both geographically and hierarchically, in a crisis. Operational units are 
ostensibly field agents; front lines responders to the disaster. ‘t hart et al (1993) argue that 
one the advantages of operational units is their “local presence” which provides a 
familiarity with the scene. These front-liners include community branches of charities 
and local populations. A common sight during floods, for example, is the presence of 
suburban streets being populated with a flotilla of small, personal sailing vessels for the 
purpose of extracting people from rooftops or ferrying supplies. Although strategic units 
are often pre-deployed, the emphasis in both the pre- and post-disaster environments is to 
better equip the local population with the tools to respond more effectively, that is, to 
help the locals help themselves.
Operational units are not only a “local presence” but locally-based, locally-
sourced, and locally-focused. The fact that equipment and employees are in the 
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immediate area creates an interesting tension in a crisis situation: on the one hand, the 
members are all aware of the damage and are on hand to assist. However, on the other 
hand, these responders are also the most likely to be affected by the disaster which can 
cause tensions between their responsibilities to their jobs and to their own families or 
property.
Open Operational
Open operational actors are pluralistic, local groups merging to provide 
immediate assistance. As first responders, these groups are able to disperse across a large 
area, following separate plans to achieve success with search and rescue and mitigation. 
The horizontal integration means their overall mission is comparable (disaster response) 
but their roles differ according to regional imperatives and priorities. The main advantage 
with open units is their flexibility. If the current plan is ineffective, each unit is more able 
to improvise than their closed counterparts. In this thesis, I also include community 
groups such as local charity branches and Churches because the personnel are sourced 
locally, they have local knowledge and familiarity, and are community focused. Their 
presence is unavoidable in a response and is a vital element that needs to be further 
analysed. 
The main faults with the open operational structure are fragmentation, 
communication, and overlap. Although more able to adapt, if leadership is inexperienced 
operational units have the potential for fragmented responses that are inconsistent across 
the disaster area. Due to the number of operational actors that are deployed after a 
disaster and the area that they cover, effective communication of missions and objectives 
is a significant obstacle. Finally, improvisation can hinder the procedures and protocols 
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from closed units. During Katrina, locals attempted to sandbag the levees before experts
and equipment arrived. The result was a suboptimal and ultimately unhelpful obstacle. 
Closed Operational
Closed operational units are locals who are deliberately organized in a vertical 
hierarchy. These units are generally more professional such as the police and fire 
department and use defined procedures and hierarchy which supports more effective 
communication between actors. A major advantage of the professional nature of closed 
structures means there is more potential for experts to be a part of the response. The 
assumption of command and control combines with a reliance on contingency plans and 
anticipation. Closed operational actors use protocols to complete objective and technical 
actions as set by their strategic counterparts. 
Anticipation is only effective provided that all contingencies are planned for. This 
is rarely the case during disaster responses due to equipment arriving late or being 
destroyed, or debris blocking access to victims. Unplanned events also have the potential 
to de-couple the hierarchy and cause breakdowns. A main fault of vertical hierarchies is 
that if isolated or without communication they are less likely to be able adapt to the 
context that open systems (Dynes 1976; 2000).
Failures
Operational and strategic actors face similar problems in a crisis: time constraints, 
the difficulty of prioritizing suffering, and coping with the enormity of a situation are all 
issues that need to be overcome if a response is to be successful. On top of the 
comparable obstacles across the two groups of actors, there are a number of individual 
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risks and failures that can be caused by communication problems, coordination deficits, 
and because of varied degrees of competence. 
There will always be failures in disaster responses. Time, equipment, personnel 
are all elements that are too easily wasted, misplaced, or under-utilized. This is not to say 
there are no successes in failed responses. The Katrina Committee strenuously promoted 
the Coast Guard as an organization that was exemplary in an otherwise lacklustre effort 
(Senate Report 2006:15). Equally, there are always elements in a successful response, 
such as the Midwest floods, that are considered to be failures, such as a local 
improvisation hindering federal efforts (Tierney, 1995:7). Considering that failures, 
regardless how large or small, are inevitable in disasters, it is useful to create a set of 
criteria for what constitutes a failure. The question of whether there are any failures that 
are exclusive for operational or strategic actors arises. This section explores the potential 
risks for operational and strategic actors as well as open and closed structures.
One of the advantages of operational and open units is their capacity to adapt to 
unforeseen circumstances faster than their strategic and closed counterparts (‘t hart et al 
1993:19). On the one hand, this can lead to a more effective response with local units 
being able to use the resources they have available to the greatest effect. On the other 
hand, there are two potential risks of such an adaptive unit: first, the potential for mission 
fragmentation, and second, the possibility of jurisdictional overlap. While open units, and 
operational actors, are designed to be flexible, a problem arises when community groups 
are so dispersed that they are unable to confirm what their mission is with superiors. This 
is a symptom of a deficit in long-term strategic thinking in operational units: it appears to 
be the most effective means of action to have community units attempt to repair flood-
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damaged housing, rather than take into consideration the mayor, governor, and 
reconstructive experts’ belief that razing the houses is safer and more efficient with 
resources at hand. 
Open and operational units are designed to be able to respond and adapt to local 
concerns. It has been a FEMA directive that local and state disaster services should be the 
primary providers of disaster relief (FRP 1992; NRP 2006). Federal relief, from FEMA 
or the Army, is only supposed to be a last resort, after the state and local units have been 
overwhelmed. In theory, if a disaster is “routine” then there is little need for a mass 
federal mobilization of equipment and troops/personnel. In practice Presidents have been 
rather broad with their classification of a disaster as a “state of emergency” and thus 
authorizing federal support. There are two reasons for this; first, FEMA is designed to 
assist responses at any and every level: if a mass mobilization is needed, then it is able to 
comply, just as it is able to provide logistic support for long-term infrastructure 
reconstruction and insurance claims. Second, Dekker and Hansen (2006) have 
documented the political nature of Presidential declarations. They argue that often 
politically sensitive states, like Florida or California are given resources even though the 
impact of a disaster might be minimal. For example, after Katrina, there were insurance 
claims for damages due to rain from Katrina from as far north as Delaware (FEMA
2007a).
Conclusion
Operational, Open, Closed, and Strategic theories share many similarities and are 
complement each other. The main argument I wish to emphasis is that organizations can 
be a mixture of these four elements as opposed to being solely closed or open. Increasing 
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the scope of analysis and disaggregating each organization allows for a more solid 
understand of individual roles, missions, and what are the most efficient and effective 
combinations in a disaster response.
With Operational and Strategic units clarified, it is necessary to project these
concepts onto the existing Open and Closed theories and examples of failed and 
successful responses. Undoubtedly each unit or organization has a unique structure. 
However, this structure cannot be simplistically labelled as either “open” or “closed”. 
Instead, applying the two layers that are activated in the planning and implementation 
stages of policies, strategic and operational, is required. Disaggregating these layers will 
provide a better platform from which the middle ground between the two theories can be 
approached. Units’ strategic and operational structure is a combination of open and 
closed systems. Examples of these structures can be found in Figure 3.2 and will be used 
throughout the analysis.
Those arguing for a more “open” framework assert that each disaster demands a 
different response (due to the geography, demography, and resources for example), and 
therefore the response should be as flexible as possible. Proponents of the “closed” 
framework argue that contingency plans that designate roles and clearly define missions 
are more effective when time pressures are a predominant factor. I argue it is 
unreasonable to believe that the “best” structure is either wholly open or wholly closed. 
Instead, organizations (and responses in general) require a measure of both flexibility and 
hierarchy to be effective in disasters. 
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Table 3.2 – Examples
Operational Strategic
Open
Alcoholics Anonymous Centres
Church Groups
Terrorist Cells
(Some) Charity Organizations
Closed
Police Watch Commanders
Fire Department
Military
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Chapter Four – Case Studies – Failures
Introduction
Failed responses to disasters have received the majority of academic attention. 
However, the prevailing analytic framework needs to be fine-tuned. Instead of 
characterising disasters as wholly open or closed, scholars will gain more leverage by 
disaggregating the responders  into strategic and operational levels in order to examine 
whether or not there is an exemplary model, or a pattern, which can be more widely 
applied. An analysis in these terms could be adopted by the scholarly community to 
better understand the causes of failure in disaster management. 
By examining the failures in responses to Hurricanes Andrew and Katrina, I argue 
that the combination of strategically open and operationally closed units is suboptimal. 
This is shown by the increased confusion caused by both multiple strategic actors with 
multiple missions, and also by inept leaders. Furthermore, operationally closed units are 
effective only if providing with adequate training, equipment, and given clear objectives.
Andrew
Introduction - Why was Andrew a Failure?
Hurricane Andrew, which ravaged South Florida and Louisiana in August 1992, 
was the most devastating hurricane to affect the US to date. It was responsible for almost 
thirty deaths, destroyed twenty-five thousand houses and caused $27 billion dollars in 
damage. There was also a second agent in the devastation: FEMA. The response to 
Andrew in Florida characterises the term “disastrous response” and was caused by a 
series of structural errors that reveal problems larger than the sum of their parts. 
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I argue that there were four main reasons why the response failed. First, there 
were major coordination failures at the strategic level involving FEMA, Secretary Card, 
and the Military; second, there were communication breakdowns at all levels (in terms of 
the flow of information, requests, and objectives); third, multiple and conflicting missions 
meant that FEMA was ill-prepared to respond; and finally, poor leadership made 
strategically closed units ineffective; and finally, These failures were the fault of both 
closed and open frameworks. The multiple closed, strategic actors working in isolation 
created an open system which led to confusion with who was in charge and what plan to 
implement. Strategic actors, like FEMA, either stuck too rigidly to the Federal Response 
Plan (FRP), or as was the case with Card, flouted previously held conventions. Multiple 
strategic actors were driven by multiple missions and inept leaders, which caused 
overlaps and evasions of responsibility.  Although the operational level should have been 
open due to the amount of actors, FEMA centralized the response into several offices 
which resulted in bottlenecks for requests.
The three primary actors responding to Hurricane Andrew, responsible for 
overarching strategic direction and policy were FEMA, Secretary Card’s Task Force on 
Hurricane Andrew Recovery, and the Military. Each actor had a vertically integrated 
hierarchy, attempted to conform to pre-prepared protocols, and focused on bringing order 
to chaos through command and control. As such, each of these can be characterized as a 
closed system.  Paradoxically, these three actors working at the same time trying to 
resolve the issues creates a system that is more akin to an open framework as there are 
multiple actors working independently from one another, implementing unique plans 
with little communication with each other. 
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I examine what plan each actor used to respond (be it FRP or otherwise), how 
multiple missions affected the response, leadership clashes, and communication to argue 
that despite having shared characteristics of closed strategic systems, the three actors 
working alongside each other, but not in concert, was unsuitable. Theoretically, closed 
strategic systems are more likely to yield success, and therefore the system that was 
implemented by the three strategically closed actors after Andrew should have been 
optimal. However, in practice, this combination created a strategically open framework 
which further exacerbated the disaster. Concurrently, I examine the operational level and 
demonstrate that although a number of units were active in the response, including the 
local community, the decision to centralize requests through a small number of offices, 
with a small number of personnel, was fundamentally flawed. 
Adherence to a plan
The guiding principles for FEMA action were articulated in the FRP.  This called 
for strict guidelines and procedures for requesting assistance and FEMA’s response and 
included “the process and methodology for implementing and managing Federal recovery 
and mitigation programs and support/technical services” (FEMA 1992). Action on 
FEMA’s behalf hinged on communication between its field offices and operational units 
(i.e. local governments and first responders). The formation of the FRP was designed to 
mitigate the inevitable delays and confusion when responding to a disaster. Ideally the 
policy called for a “bottom-up” approach where Federal and State actors augment local 
efforts at their request. There was however considerable scope for federal agencies to 
intervene and implement policy from a “top-down” perspective.
49
The response in South Florida was neither of these. The local entities neither 
understood nor complied with the FRP and did not request Federal intervention- although 
they did request support in the form of supplies such as tents, water, and generators 
(Schneider 1995). While the FRP had room for Federal discretion in intervening in the 
local context, FEMA did not understand the degree to which local actors were 
overwhelmed as they had received no request from locals to intervene. As such, FEMA 
found itself in a “Request and Receive” role whereby minimal operational activities were 
required. This led to significant problems: requests for supplies were not approved and
equipment was not being sent. 
The nature of the FRP as being largely “bottom-up” also explains FEMA’s 
position in the disaster. Although some units were pre-positioned in an attempt to 
centralize assistance offices, the bulk of FEMA’s strategic actors were distant from the 
disaster. The major problem with this position is the lack of overt time pressures, and the 
possibility of underestimating the immediacy behind some of the requests. FEMA 
believed they could take longer with their decisions compared to those made by 
operational units. Strategic actors relied on protocols and bureaucratic conventions, rather 
than remaining flexible which consequently led to paralysis in the flow of information 
and supplies.
Additional strategic units further complicated the response and led to 
fragmentation. After three days of inaction from a paralysed FEMA, President G.W.H. 
Bush was embarrassed into action by Kate Hale’s (in)famous call to arms “enough is 
enough. Quit playing like a bunch of kids. Where the hell is the cavalry on this one? For 
God’s sake, where are they?” (Cooper and Block, 2006:57). Consequently President 
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G.W.H. Bush circumvented the FRP and created the “Task Force on Hurricane Andrew 
Recovery” led by Secretary of Transport Andrew Card (hereafter: Card). This action
further opened the strategic framework and functionally sidelined/excluded FEMA from 
the rest of the operation with the implication being that chaos had ensued due to a lack of 
cohesion between FEMA and South Floridians.
Instead of following FRP protocols, Card implemented his own plan to distribute 
money which the administration believed could be used for food and shelter (Schneider 
1995). These grants were approved without going through standard procedures (Cooper 
and Block 2006). However, although the money was welcomed, there were no banks 
open and people who needed money also generally had more pressing problems, such as 
mitigating further damage to their houses. In his attempt “to cut through the bureaucratic 
mess” (Schneider, 1995:95), Card had fragmented the overall strategic response and 
added to the confusion over which plan was being implemented. Confusion, and 
ultimately suboptimal outcomes, caused long term ramifications with insurance claims 
and Card’s funds needing retrospective approval for over a year afterwards4.
Concurrently the Army was being deployed for the first time in a domestic 
disaster (Mittler 1997). While FEMA and Card clashed over how to distribute aid, the 
Army’s arrival completely paralysed any efforts to bring disaster personnel, supplies, or 
equipment into the area. The planes that could have been carrying these supplies were 
instead diverted to carry troops. Hale stated that “for the first few days the Army made 
the situation worse: it meant we needed to feed, hydrate, and shelter 20,000 more people” 
(FEMA, 1993). The Army, the third strategic actor in the response, not only brought with 
                                                
4 When James Lee Witt took over as FEMA Director in 1993, he commented on the amount of claims that 
were still yet to be approved. This confusion, and increasing of red tape, was largely due to The Task Force 
(Daniels and Clark-Daniels, 2000)
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it additional personnel, but also another method of implementing a response. The 
strategic level now had three heads, FEMA, Card, and the Army, and also three plans of 
action, the FRP, cutting red tape, and logistical support. Although the Army was 
successful after it deployed, the confusion and fragmentation it caused by being in South 
Florida was a significant obstacle.  
Mission
Open frameworks allow for each individual actor to act independently. One 
reason why each strategic actor had a unique method of implementing was because they 
had all defined their missions and roles differently. FEMA’s mission in 1992 was in a 
state of flux. On the one hand, it had be designed in 1979 to respond to disasters, both 
man-made and natural, but it was also given the task of “Continuity of Government” if a 
foreign power should ever attempt a strike on the US homeland (Bullock et al 2006).
During Andrew it became clear that these missions, although completely independent of 
one another, affected the efficacy of the strategic response. FEMA’s “Black” or classified 
projects involving satellite technology and mobile communications trucks were not 
permitted to be used in a scenario involving a natural disaster (Cooper and Block, 
2006:46, 60). These technologies, which would prove to be vital in future responses,
demonstrated that FEMA was still geared towards the Cold War instead of disaster 
response. FEMA’s inability to deploy technology caused jurisdictional overlap because 
the Army was required to fill the technology gap and attempt to integrate with local 
responders. It also led to strategic evasion, whereby due to FEMA being sidelined by 
Card and the Army, it was unclear if the role it had inherited was more than simply 
“Request and Receive”. 
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Card’s mission could not be described as strictly disaster response, but rather a 
combination of (short-term) response and (long term) relief. This dual purpose highlights 
the latent political motives. Schneider (1995) argues that Card’s deployment became 
more of a political exercise than one focused on human needs. Finally, it was the 
potential for political backlash that overwhelmed political actors (namely the President) 
and caused the Army to be deployed in South Florida. The Army’s overt mission may 
have been to augment and support the National Guard, which they did admirably, 
however the tacit reason was to publicly demonstrate to both Floridians and Americans at 
large, that the President was (at last) willing to intervene with everything he had.
Closed strategic actors work on the assumption that chaos requires command and 
control. The Army was brought in because the National Guard had been overwhelmed, 
mainly due to their base in Homestead being flattened by the winds. The Army wisely 
chose to delegate law and order, and response activities between its own units and the 
Guard. The combination of the Army’s and Guard’s hierarchical structures, both of which 
are trained to accept orders, lead to a largely successful division of responsibilities.
However, quantity is no substitute for punctuality. Even with the increased funds and 
attention, a significant amount of damage had been done because they had arrived three 
days late.
Card’s Task Force was active and hands on, distributing cheques in a quasi-door-
to-door fashion. However, the aid did not solve “immediate” problems like a lost roof or 
home, nor did it assist hospitals who were low on beds. Simply put, you can’t eat a 
cheque or have surgery on the promise of payment. Card strategically evaded the short 
term requests for aid and instead attempted to produce short term political success with 
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money. In this way, the response was further fragmented because there were two sets of 
strategic actors with two unique missions. On the one hand, FEMA was attempting, albeit 
slowly, to meet human needs, and on the other, Card who had more latent political 
motives, namely, attempting to secure votes in a swing state during a Presidential election 
year. The range of unique actors with distinct missions highlights the difficulties inherent 
in an open framework at the strategic level. 
Leadership 
Although strategically closed structures are desirable in a response because they 
are most likely to create optimal outcomes due to more ability to communicate via 
hierarchy and comply with orders, even the most perfectly structured, strategically closed 
unit needs good leadership. Wallace Stickney, the Director of FEMA during Andrew, 
was not a good leader. A major factor in the failed response was due to his being a 
political appointee with no disaster experience.  He was famously quoted as saying that if 
he “went back to work for the government for three more years” he would receive “a nice 
retirement package” (Cooper and Block, 2006:57). This became a problem for local 
officials and political actors like the President, when supplies were not arriving and locals 
were unable to respond to the magnitude of calls for help. His inexperience led to 
bureaucratic paralysis during the first three days after landfall because objectives and 
jurisdictions had not been clarified before the storm, nor had objectives been 
communicated to responding actors after the storm. 
Stickney was the central point in FEMA’s hierarchy. With strategic decision-
making taking place (or not taking place) at Stickney’s level, paralysis and information 
overload were potential problems that could, and did, negatively affect the response. By 
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concentrating power towards the executive, for example, requisite official documents and 
signatures for request approval, the response was immediately hampered by a quagmire 
of paperwork. The centralization appeared to only have one advantage and a political one 
at that: three days into the disaster, when it became clear that “the cavalry” was not 
coming, it gave President G.W.H. Bush a scapegoat who he could fire. After Stickney
was dismissed, a void was left at FEMA’s helm at a crucial moment during the response. 
In attempting to fill this void, the President enacted a type of “formal” strategic evasion, 
whereby Card was given separate, almost opposite responsibilities to FEMA and told to 
respond with money rather than food and medicine (Mathews et al 1992).
Beyond blaming individuals lies the fact that FEMA itself had a relative small 
amount of employees considering it was in charge of twenty-seven agencies. Only 
approximately three hundred employees “were trained in disaster relief services and those 
who are trained are underused” (Foreman, 2005). In fact after Andrew Leo Bosner, a 
Senior FEMA Official stated that; “FEMA's biggest problem is that too few people in the 
agency are trained to help in emergencies. You have a small number of people doing 
disaster work while the rest of us go back to our desks…[w]e have good soldiers but 
crummy generals” (Foreman, 2005). FEMA’s inability to respond to requests for 
assistance was a direct result of their own conventions and Stickney’s miscalculations. 
Operational Closed
Although functionally the operational level, with its multiple actors, should be 
open, the response was centralized towards FEMA offices, through which all requests for 
assistance were made. FEMA was operating in a relatively open system, but creating 
conditions by funnelling requests that make it more closed than open. The focal point for 
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equipment and aid requests, offices were of great importance in terms of command and 
control. Although damage assessment teams worked on technical issues, public servants 
and professionals in the offices were in charge of centralizing requests. This was done 
through official documents, needing official signatures, and duplication. The paradox of 
bureaucracy, which is necessary in order to find how, where, and when resources are 
available, is that the process is often slow and cumbersome. When strategic leadership 
failed, and when faced with increasing time pressures, FEMA’s operational arm reverted 
to conventions set out in the FRP and quickly ground to a halt, paralysing the major 
distributor of aid and assistance.
It is important to note that FEMA was not completely reactive in its approach. 
Closed systems are designed with anticipation and contingencies in mind. In fact, 
believing that the storm would affect a large urban area, FEMA had been in the area 
setting up offices and signing request forms twenty-four hours before (Schneider 1995). 
Unfortunately, these were counter-productive, as requests from the following three days,
those that referenced actual deficiencies, were placed in a lower priority to these 
“proactive” ones. The lack of prioritizing is one of the major failings of FEMA’s 
operational actors caused by a reliance on protocols as instilled in the FRP. Although 
hierarchy generally provides a reliable communication framework, being “closed” meant 
that flexibility, such as using mobile phones on a large scale, came into effect too late.
The added flexibility from open actors would prove to be vital for the response. 
However it would be a fallacy to argue that there were no successful closed actors. In fact, 
apart for the initial problems with deployment, the Army was the most productive actor 
in the response. While Card and FEMA struggled with political problems, the Army was 
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able to focus on its sole mission in the disaster: response. By delegating enforcement 
roles to the National Guard, the Army was able to channel all of its resources into a single 
mission. The addition of a further artificial body (which employed command and control 
functions) succeeded because objectives were well known by all affected parties. The 
professional training and experience that the Generals were able to bring to Florida 
proved that the Army could be a viable partner in disaster management. In fact, in the 
Andrew’s aftermath Senator Reid argued that all crisis management should be given to 
the Military (GAO 1993). The closed, artificial body was successful, but perhaps made 
more so in comparison to the bungled, ill-prepared efforts of FEMA.
Communication
Dependence on protocols as instilled within each strategic and operational actor 
caused communication failures between strategic actors, and between strategic and 
operational units. They were a result of the mixture of missions and leadership 
breakdowns. Each closed actor had established a stringent and narrow mission which 
impinged on their ability to coordinate with the operational heads in the field – there was 
no indication from strategic heads that the response should be more flexible if it was not 
working effectively. As such, when there were no orders from above, because of a 
preoccupation with requests or a lack of the severity of the situation, there was little or no 
action on the ground. This obstructed the distribution of aid and essential supplies to the 
affected population causing frustration and adding to the potential for a breakdown of law 
and order.
Communication before the disaster had not been an issue for the Army. A week 
before the hurricane, based on their experience with Hurricane Hugo, they had compiled 
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lists of needed items such as tents, blankets, water, and electric generators for FEMA. 
Although the Army was ready to go, State officials in Florida did not have a clear idea of 
the damage done. The communication breakdown would be another example in a 
mistake-riddled response.
The generals’ ability to delegate proved to be a decisive factor in the success of 
the operation after the Army arrived. More clarity was achieved by separating the 
National Guard and Army objectives, thus reducing the likelihood of jurisdictional 
overlap. Although moving troops and segregating missions is seemingly an active, hands 
on function, in the overall scheme of events the generals played a supportive role to the 
individual ground units who complied with their orders. The centralized structure of the 
Military allowed more efficient communications up and down the hierarchy: requests 
were made and generally fulfilled because there were fewer levels of “red tape” to cut 
through. 
Communication means more than just requests for aid or mission clarifications. 
At the strategic level it alludes to how much autonomy the organization has and how 
much access it has to the President. Although FEMA was an autonomous unit, that is, 
able to define its own mission and design a plan of action it was hampered by its archaic 
Civil Defence role. Moreover, because Stickney was an inexperienced political 
appointment, he did not have the influence to attempt to change this role too dramatically. 
In an open system the ability to communicate is vital. The rigidity of FEMA’s FRP meant 
that when phone lines were destroyed, and satellite phones were unavailable, the central 
offices were essentially cut-off from any strategic guidance. 
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Conclusion
The response model that was employed after Andrew was flawed. The 
combination of three strategically closed actors did not help to clarify roles, and instead 
forced a morph into a strategically open framework. This framework was inappropriate 
for Andrew. Although many studies tend to conclude that “all level of government need 
more communication” (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1984:133) in this case it would not 
work. More communication is not as important as accurate communication, for example, 
what plan is (or is not) being implemented, and who is in ultimate control. The existence 
of three actors, with three missions, three leadership styles, and three plans, was destined 
to cause confusion and overlap. 
Operationally, problems presented themselves which were caused by the 
aforementioned deficiencies. Although the bungled deployment of the Army marred the 
effort in the short term, its mission and leadership quickly made it the crucial actor. It was 
only when the Army was able to adapt to the situation, and delegate responsibilities with 
enforcement and response that success became a likely outcome. Hierarchy was 
important ensure actors complied, but it came down to how quickly strategic and 
operational actors could adapt to difficulties. In this case, this was most effectively 
fulfilled by closed operational actors.
Katrina
Introduction – Why was Katrina a Failure?
Hurricane Katrina was the most damaging disaster in the history of the United 
States. The Category Five hurricane which made landfall in Louisiana on 28th August, 
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2005 was responsible for 1,100 deaths, led to the displacement of over a million people, 
and left a disaster area the size of Great Britain (Robinson et al 2006; Roberts 2006). 
Despite the successful evacuation of 1.2 million citizens, warnings from weather bureaus, 
and pre-positioning of supplies, FEMA’s response was nonetheless a disaster. As 
observed of the Andrew response, the combination of strategically open and operationally 
closed actors was inappropriate. I argue there are three reasons for this. First, the 
ambiguity and complexity of the newly forged National Response Plan caused a 
significant amount of confusion over which of the three strategic actors (FEMA, 
Department of Homeland Security [DHS], and the military) was responsible for the 
response. Second, weak compliance with the NRP was caused by inept leadership and 
conflicting missions. In choosing to implement their own independent plans strategic 
actors caused confusion, overlap, and coordination problems. Finally, micro-management 
by the operational branch of FEMA and the DHS Homeland Security Operational Centre 
(HSOC) slowed the response with duplication and inexperience.
The system was eerily similar to one implemented in Andrew thirteen years 
before. A new strategic plan, the NRP emphasised centralization over flexibility and the 
combination of three strategically closed actors (DHS, FEMA, and the military) caused 
the framework to shift from closed to open. Also both Katrina and Andrew had an 
operationally closed entity, in this case the Homeland Security Operational Centre 
(HSOC) that attempted to adhere to procedures and conventions while local units were 
openly disregarding them.
Despite these similarities with Andrew, ultimately the response to Katrina was a 
failure of its own making, albeit with the same combination of open strategic and closed 
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operational frameworks. Although FEMA had learnt some lessons from the Andrew 
response, the erroneous adoption of a similar overarching framework made the similar 
mistake of being open rather than closed. FEMA, DHS, and the military spent almost 
four days “discussing” who would be in charge of the response while New Orleans’ 
citizens languished without food, shelter, and the city almost completely underwater. 
Each agency had a vertically integrated hierarchy and was attempting to implement the 
NRP which sought to bring order command and control to the area. However, the crowd 
of actors, and the willingness of each actor to use their veto in decision-making, made the 
system more akin to an open framework. It appeared that FEMA had not learnt, or could 
not recognise, that an open framework was inappropriate for a strategic response. I 
examine the NRP and the discussions surrounding definitions of response and leadership, 
and how multiple missions caused delays and deficiencies, to demonstrate why the open 
framework was unsatisfactory. Furthermore, I examine the decision from the operational 
level to impose a closed policy to argue that maintaining the pre-existing open framework 
may have produced better results.
Puzzled about the Plan
The NRP was an “all-hazards approach” to disaster response. It contained similar 
procedures and protocols to the FRP. Both plans provided guidelines for implementing a 
top-down response within a closed framework. They differed largely in terms only of 
definitions of disasters. The NRP stated that in the event of a “catastrophic disaster” DHS 
would take over at the strategic level. “Normal” disasters would require FEMA’s 
assistance, whereas “run-of-the-mill” disasters would be left to local authorities (Cooper 
and Block 2006). In each case the framework was closed – a single strategic actor would 
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be in charge of the response from beginning to end. The success of the plan depended on 
a clear definition of each disaster and moreover, clarity with regards to which actor had 
the authority to define it. No such provisions were evident in the NRP. Although the NRP 
envisioned a proactive national response in the event of a catastrophe, it did not have the 
types of detailed plans needed to better delineate responsibilities or plans for how such 
assistance would be provided and coordinated. Given that the NRP was not being 
implemented, the environment took on the characteristics of an open framework. 
The loose alliance of three strategic actors made decisions on the definition of 
“catastrophic” and leadership difficult. Moreover, the NRP does not provide a definition 
of a “catastrophic” disaster nor does it state who is responsible for applying the definition: 
in one section the Presidential declaration is enough, whereas in another the task is left to 
the Deputy-Director of DHS (DHS, 2006). By not using the NRP (or not knowing how to 
implement it), the open framework foregrounded the independent response plans from 
each strategic actor. The DHS asserted a disaster should only be designated
“catastrophic” in the event of a terrorist attack, lest the gravity of the situation be lessened 
(Cooper and Block 2006:121). Instead, an arbitrary criterion was used to define what a 
catastrophic disaster would look like in New Orleans: had the levees been breached? 
(Cooper and Block 2006:122-123) This seemingly innocuous question meant the 
difference between FEMA or DHS being deployed. The lack of a centralized strategic 
actor, and the existence of too many vetoes over who was in charge of defining the 
disaster was directly responsible for the response being delayed for nearly five days.
The open frameworks’ dispersed, pluralistic units meant that communication to 
all members was difficult. DHS’s definitions of “catastrophic” and “normal” were 
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subjective. Although they would intervene if there was a breach, they would not do so if 
the levees were “only” overtopped. Regardless, information about the situation was 
needed to differentiate. Operational units from FEMA and the National Guard were 
already in the disaster zone and had links to their strategic counterparts. FEMA’s units 
reported that the levee had been breached, whereas Guard units stated that it had been 
overtopped. In fact, the levee had been breached before Katrina had made landfall 
(Moynihan 2006; Kweit and Kweit 2006). Operational actors cried out that “it didn’t 
matter what type of flooding was occurring, the fact that seventy percent of the city was 
underwater should have been definition enough” (Brinkley 2007:304). The lack of 
centralized leadership in the strategically open framework meant that deliberations 
between multiple actors regarding what type of flooding was occurring was prioritized 
over providing support for those already affected. Communication breakdowns merely 
emphasized the futility of the open system as a viable response structure. 
Mission
The multitude of active units within the strategically open framework meant that 
the response became influenced by multiple missions. Conflict between missions led to 
differences in opinions about how the response should progress leading to confusion, 
duplication, and delays. The most pertinent examples of this influence occurred when 
FEMA lost its position in the President’s Cabinet, a large portion of its experienced 
leaders resigned, and it was subsumed into the DHS after the attacks on September 11. 
The change also meant a modifying FEMA’s role to be subservient during responses as 
well. FEMA’s submissive role in the vertical hierarchy may have been effective had DHS 
taken control of the Katrina response. This structure, which is more akin to a closed 
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framework, would have instilled a clear sense of hierarchy into the response. By 
centralizing the response, with a clear leader and objectives, all units would be united in 
fulfilling a single plan. Instead, at the strategic level, DHS deliberated, FEMA waited for 
orders, and the military was silent. 
The lack of a unified strategic mission within the open framework led to 
confusion over requests and duplication of procedure. Under the auspices of DHS FEMA 
was unable to call the shots on the ground unless during a “normal” disaster. Moreover, 
the requirement that requests be processed through DHS not only caused duplication but 
meant FEMA had little access to information about when and where supplies were 
coming from. This became clear during the response to Katrina with requests for buses. 
FEMA had received a verbal request for five hundred buses from Governor Blanco but 
the request had to be “officialized [sic] by the DHS bureaucracy” (Cooper and Block 
2006:213). Problems arose when Blanco terminated the search for local school buses 
believing FEMA’s promise to have the buses there in twelve hours. Strict procedures and 
protocols, including having the document set back to the operational command post for a 
signature, meant that they did not arrive for another two days (ibid., 2006). FEMA’s 
mission was focused on responding to actual deficiencies on the ground. DHS was more 
worried about the cost of transport and drivers. The open response, with multiple 
strategic actors, unnecessarily delayed assistance due to protocols and conventions.
Even if DHS had taken over the response, there was no guarantee the closed 
framework would have averted disaster. The DHS’s missions which were focused on 
terrorism-related issues, and enforcing command and control, resulted in the response 
being incorrectly targeted. DHS protocols for the immediate response included objective 
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such as “apprehending the assailants” and “sweeping for secondary devices” (DHS, 2006) 
implying that their response was guided towards terrorism and not human needs. 
Moreover, before local actors could receive funding or equipment they were required to 
demonstrate its use to combat terrorism. Harrold points out that flat-bottomed boats (for 
use in floods) that New Orleans requested were rejected on the basis that they had “no-
dual purpose” (2006:266). On the other hand, the city was granted the use of Hazardous 
Material chemical suits. The preoccupation with terrorism and insecurity shifted the focus 
from assisting the 26,000 starving victims in the Superdome, onto impounding food 
rations on route to New Orleans because “the cans could be used to manufacture 
explosive devices” (Roberts 2006). Bazerman and Watkins (2006) describe this situation 
as a “predictable surprise”, that is one where, an organization is focused on the wrong 
issues or the personnel are ill-equipped, a failed response can be traced back to a series of 
obvious deficits.
There was one successful responder, the military, which was deployed five days 
after the levees broke on September 2, 2005. Much like during Andrew, the Military was 
able to delegate responsibilities onto its affiliates – Search and Rescue operations to the 
Coast Guard who had already begun sorties, and portions of law enforcement to the 
National Guard. The Military had a clearly defined mission: “provide…support, plan, and 
execute….full logistical support to the Katrina disaster in all declared states” (Senate 
Report 2006:23). The reduction of objectives meant that the military was able to focus on 
levee repair and sandbagging, and distribution of resources. The vertically integrated 
hierarchy meant that each actor (Military, National Guard, and Coast Guard) knew their 
objective from the beginning. The informal, open framework which FEMA and DHS 
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were working under failed because there was no single point of contact. Requests, 
information about flooding and damage, as well as pleas for help from victims were lost 
in a framework where responsibility was constantly shirked and evaded because of 
confusion over jurisdictions. 
Micromanagement
Delays in the implementation of the NRP, which promoted an operationally 
closed framework, meant other operational actors were forced to begin their responses 
without strict guidelines or overarching objectives. I argue that when HSOC arrived it 
exacerbated rather than alleviated the disaster. In contrast the “chaotic” structure, where 
each unit ignored the wider plan and was responsible for its own objectives, was largely a 
success. 
The NRP stated that a single strategic actor, be it FEMA, DHS, or Local 
government, would ensure the most effective response if they were in charge of both 
strategic and operational functions (DHS 2006). On Wednesday night at 8:22pm the DHS 
ordered its operational arm, the Homeland Security Operations Centre, into the area to 
take over from FEMA. This signalled a formal sidelining of FEMA, even though it had 
already deployed three MERS command vehicles and two Urban Search and Rescue 
(USR) teams. 
Due to communications breakdowns, it was impossible to broadcast this change to 
every member of the response. Consequently the transition between FEMA and DHS was 
marred by confusion and logistical delays. Moreover, the clearest cause of failure was 
due to DHS’s attempt to impose a closed framework on an already functioning open 
framework. For the first five days, operational actors such as the Federal Protective 
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Services, Coast Guard, and locals, displayed their own initiative to fill the gap in unified 
command. The result was an open framework whereby flexible, independent units 
determined their own rescue priorities, areas to be searched, and locations to drop off the 
people they rescued. By the time HSOC had deployed, its influence as a commanding 
actor had diminished.
HSOC’s reliance on procedures as set out in the NRP added to confusion due to 
the delayed deployment. Members of a Louisiana Fire Department reported receiving “a 
lot of ‘I don’t knows’ from [local] government officials…the command structure broke 
down—we were literally left to our own devices.” (Cooper and Block 2006:180-181) In 
fact, actors that did not follow the NRP and HSOC were more successful. 
The more open framework tended to suit the environment where communications 
had broken down and no central leadership had been established. Local, open systems 
like “Boat Gangs” were amongst the most successful – driving to the edge of a flooded 
region, unhitching their boats, and ferrying victims from their rooftops to dry land 
(Brinkley 2007). Equally, the most effective closed actor was the Coast Guard who 
managed to rescue thirty thousand people over the course of the response (Senate Report 
2006). Where the mission and objectives were clear – saving isolated victims – both 
systems tended towards success. However, local improvisation also caused problems. 
Army Corps of Engineer members, for example, witnessed locals attempting to sandbag a 
breached levee and although they were informed by the ACE (who built the levees) that 
their actions were futile, the locals refused to stop (Cooper and Block 2006). 
The closed framework was ineffective because it arrived too late and attempted to 
influence the response instead of adapting to the pre-existing one. Although the closed 
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framework would have better enabled local response officials to direct operations, obtain 
situational awareness, and generate requests for assistance to State and Federal authorities, 
local actors who began the response without official confirmation were amongst the most 
effective, provided they had access to information and experienced personnel.
Conclusion
In a similar situation to Andrew, the frameworks that were used to respond to 
Katrina were unsuitable. Although the over-arching plan had been to implement a closed, 
strategic system, deliberations involving multiple strategic actors led to delays and a 
muddling transformation into an open strategic framework with no central point of 
contact.
At the same time it became clear that the DHS had been preparing more for 
terrorist attacks than natural disasters. The multiple missions that were actively clashing 
during the response meant that all levels were confused about their objectives. With this 
in mind, it is unsurprising that the Governor of Mississippi and Mayor of New Orleans
blame the failed response on “failure of leadership at all levels” (Frontline 2005). When 
closed systems with clearly defined roles, such as the Military and Coast Guard, were 
deployed, they had a greater probability for success.
Finally, delays by the strategic actors caused the plan for an operationally closed 
response to fail. When the framework was finally implemented it caused confusion (some 
of which can be attributed to the slow response rather than the addition of a new actor). 
The most effective units were those who followed a more operationally open framework. 
While it was certainly not flawless, the open actors were more able to adapt to the 
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conditions, such as locals using their own boats, and ultimately became the most effective 
actors in both levels of the response.
Conclusion – Andrew and Katrina as Framework Failures
Thousands of people are affected when FEMA and disaster response fails. It is 
unsurprising then that these failures, including Andrew and Katrina, receive the most 
attention from the media and academics. However blaming “the delayed response”
(Moynihan 2006) or “dysfunction” (Brinkley 2007:451) only examines part of the 
problem. I argue that these failures occurred because the structural framework in Andrew 
and Katrina was inappropriate and encouraged a convergence of leadership, mission, and 
objective crises. 
The trend towards using a strategically open and operationally closed framework 
included factors that would lead to failures in leadership. The open strategic level, with 
multiple actors and multiple missions caused confusion over who was ultimately in 
charge of the response in both cases. Civil Defence and Counter-Terrorism clouded the 
FEMA’s main function – to respond to disasters are quickly and effectively as possible. 
Experienced leadership was also lacking. Having three strategic actors vying for, or 
attempting to evade, control over the response not only caused paralysis but also 
negatively affected operational actors with supply and request delays.
The operationally closed structure on the other hand had no central point of 
contact throughout either response. The reliance on procedures for requests added to this 
factor to create fragmentation, whereby law enforcement took precedence over meeting 
human needs. The framework ineffectively centralized the response to a small amount of 
offices and actors who were quickly overwhelmed and not able to adapt. The units that 
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flouted the closed structure and attempted to adapt to the conditions, such as the Coast 
Guard and the “boat gangs” were often the most effective.
Familiarity with the response plan is important. The fact that in Andrew and 
Katrina, the FRP and NRP had only been brought into practice a few months before 
meant that few had read it and even fewer understood it. However, good plans only go so 
far. The director of Alabama’s Emergency Management agency noted that “it’s just 
paper...it doesn’t mean crap...good plans do not mean good execution”. The 
inappropriateness of the framework used in Andrew and Katrina, with its rigid plan, inept 
leadership, and convoluted missions led to an unmitigated failure of implementation.  
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Chapter Five – Case Studies – Successes
Introduction
Unlike failures, successes are largely ignored in the literature. In doing so 
academics have overlooked factors that influence an effective response. These factors can 
be aligned in a framework with a combination of strategic and operational structures. By 
examining the successful responses to two major disasters, the Great Midwest Floods and 
Northridge Earthquake, I argue that a strategically closed and operationally open 
framework is the most appropriate. Within the responses there are instances of strong 
leadership, experienced personnel, autonomy, and mission clarity that are absent in failed 
responses to Andrew and Katrina.     
Midwest and Northridge
Introduction:
In the period 1992-2005, FEMA responded to approximately 748 disasters 
(FEMA 2007a). It was also during this period that FEMA was described as a “brand 
name” agency at the “top of its game” (Cooper and Block 2006:63-64). Two disasters 
embody FEMA’s meteoric rise from “bureaucratic jackasses” (Hearings 1995:79) to a 
dependable agency: the Great Midwest Floods and the Northridge Earthquake. 
The Disasters:
The Great Floods of 1993 (or the Great Midwest Floods) were some of the most 
far-reaching disasters in American history. Between April 1993 and January 1994, 
responders were faced with a disaster area the size of Japan, and a flood that entirely 
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engulfed Iowa and partially submerged eight other states5. In total almost fifty thousand 
houses were destroyed and an estimated sixteen billion dollars of damage was caused
(Tierney, 1995). Although the number of deaths directly attributed to the Floods was
lower than in Hurricane Andrew or Northridge, it is the scale of the Floods, insofar as it 
affected an enormous population and land mass, that ranks it as a major disaster. 
Northridge was another large-scale, catastrophic disaster. On January 17, 1994, an 
earthquake measuring 6.7 on the Richter Scale shook Los Angeles for ten seconds, 
making it the largest magnitude earthquake ever recorded in North America (Nigg, 1997). 
In total seventy-two people were killed and over twelve thousand buildings were either 
destroyed, or deemed unstable. The cost of the disaster was between twelve and twenty 
thousand million dollars, comparable with Andrew two years earlier. Unlike the Midwest 
Floods the disaster area was small; however the unpredictability of the earthquake, 
combined with the fact that it occurred in the largest county (in terms of population and
area) in America, makes this a truly significant event.  
Evidence of Success:
The Midwest and Northridge are examples of successful responses. Basic human 
needs were fulfilled in both cases. Although there were large portions of the population 
who were displaced, temporary “tent cities” were created to house these refugees almost 
immediately. Equally, aspects that plagued the Andrew and Katrina responses, such as 
requests not being fulfilled were all but non-existent in the Midwest and Northridge due 
to successful pre-deployments of personnel and “one-stop-shop” field offices that could 
work independently from each other (Comfort 1994). Shortages of water and food were 
                                                
5 The affected states were North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas, Minnesota, Iowa, Missouri, 
Wisconsin, and Illinois.
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able to be rectified with simple fixes such as supplying Des Moines, Iowa with 30 self-
contained water purification machines (Madigan 1994). In both disasters, people were 
presented with a solution to each of their problems or a work-around strategy until a 
solution could be found. FEMA’s proactive stance in these disasters, deploying experts 
and providing temporary supplies “until normalcy is restored” (Hearings 1994: 203), is at 
the foundation of all the evidence concerning why they succeeded. 
Same Success, But Different:
The Midwest is an example of the successful use of a strategically closed and 
operationally open framework. I argue there were three reasons for this success. First, 
only one strategic actor, FEMA, was in charge of the overall response which meant there 
was only one central point of contact, and one actor defining the parameters for 
operational implementation. Second, FEMA had a single mission (disaster response) that 
was untainted by other factors, meaning the response alone was its main focus. Finally, 
experience and good leadership at both operational and strategic levels encouraged better 
coordination and communication so that efficient transfers of information, requests and 
expertise became the norm rather than the exception. Both were substantial disasters that 
caused thousands of millions of dollars of damage to infrastructure and required a federal 
response. However, unlike Andrew and Katrina, there was no paralysing confusion, 
communication remained functional, and missions were clear.
It would be fallacious to argue that both of the disasters were the same. In fact 
there are two factors that are distinctly different: predictability of the disasters, and the 
number of actors. On the one hand, the drawn-out nature of the Floods meant that FEMA 
was granted more time to predict where disaster would strike and proactively mitigate 
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damages in flood prone regions. However, the lack of time pressures was countered by 
the sheer scale of coordination required of FEMA: strategic and operational units from 
nine states. Northridge was sudden. The earthquake hit without warning at 4:31am in a 
densely populated area. Coordination was relatively streamlined as FEMA’s main partner 
was the California State government. The difficulty of multiple sources of authority did 
not therefore emerge; it was rather the rapid response capacity of FEMA being tested.
Neither disaster was easy to respond to. FEMA responded to both disasters using 
the same framework which emphasised responsiveness, mobility, and flexibility. The two 
factors, predictability and number of actors, are important dimensions and should not be 
ignored.     
Outline:
I examine three elements - first, how changes to FEMA’s leadership, 
professionalization, and autonomy led to the implementation of a successful framework, 
second, the extent to which experienced, top-down leadership during the disaster 
increased the efficacy of communications and mission clarity, and finally, the benefits 
open and closed units gained from the open operational framework. I argue that a 
strategically closed and operationally open framework is the most effective when actors 
are given distinct missions, under strong leadership, and their plans are adaptable.  
Changing FEMA’s Role:
In 1992 FEMA’s new Director James Lee Witt had championed FEMA as an 
organization whose task it was to provide long term assistance (Hearings 1994: 208). 
This was a departure from previously held beliefs. During Andrew, for example, FEMA 
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had been seen, at least in the public’s eye, as a first responder to disasters: an 
organization that would be at the forefront of the response not only coordinating, but 
actively participating in repairs and cleanups. Lee Witt accepted that FEMA was not the 
best organization for these tasks; primarily because the Army was more technically adept 
at such activities and local communities were better placed, but also because if FEMA 
stayed out of the disaster it would be more efficient in providing long term support. 
Support in Lee Witt’s mind was more than providing assistance with newly-declassified 
technologies: it was about empowering actors to respond more effectively with 
information and experienced personnel. 
After Lee Witt was promoted into the President’s Cabinet, and given full 
autonomy over FEMA’s structure, he expressed a desire to change the FRP from “the 
top-down so that it would work from the bottom-up” (Schneider 1995:22-23). Both the 
Midwest Floods and Northridge saw the implementation of a new combination of 
responders – a single strategically closed actor following the FRP and assisting an 
operationally open framework.
Strategic
Coordinate This:
The employment of the FRP was successful because FEMA was the only strategic 
actor in command. Under Lee Witt, FEMA was still a closed entity. Although there was 
undoubtedly more communication both within the organization (with Lee Witt’s “Open 
Door Appointments” on Tuesday afternoons) and between Lee Witt and the President 
(after being promoted to a Cabinet position), the fundamental assumptions of disaster 
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response remained similar to the “old” FEMA, except for one factor: the increased role 
for operational units. Being experienced with disasters, Lee Witt recognised two things, 
first, operational actors are, by definition, first responders and should be assisted in that 
role. Second, locals are capable of being overwhelmed in which case more assistance, in 
the form of equipment or deployment of the Army or Guard is necessary. Because of the
autonomy granted by the President, disaster management changed. FEMA became the 
only actor coordinating at the strategic level. This resulted in a more effective 
communication of the FRP’s objectives between operational and strategic units. 
Part of this communication was the belief that, until there is a situation where 
locals are overwhelmed, FEMA is best placed to provide support instead of complicating 
the process through direct intervention. Under Lee Witt, FEMA’s supportive role was 
redefined. Instead of simply trawling through lodged requests, FEMA de-classified 
technology which was only supposed to be used in the Cold War era “Government 
Continuity Plan” and proactively setting up “one-stop-shops” in flood-prone states to 
prepare for insurance claims and aid distribution. In fact, during the Flood FEMA was 
able to set up offices in all affected states before access became a problem. By the time 
the flood engulfed the nine states, FEMA had established more than a dozen centers in 
Minnesota, Wisconsin, Iowa, Illinois and Missouri to deal with the inevitable influx of 
loan and request forms and distribute aid to victims (Blakely 2007). 
Although FEMA was not given the opportunity to pre-deploy during Northridge, 
its field office in Los Angeles was able to be converted into a comprehensive support and 
command hub within twenty-four hours of the earthquake (Nigg, 1997. This was 
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beneficial because it gave state officials a single point of reference for further assistance 
and requests, nullifying overlap and confusion concerns.  
FEMA’s supportive role in both disasters was counterbalanced by Lee Witt’s
active apart in increasing the communication and role recognition during the disaster. His
“low key hands-on, problem-solving, performance orientated approach” emphasised 
meeting human needs as its first priority (Comfort 1994:165-166). Lee Witt phoned his 
senior field officials every day, and personally contacted Congressmen from all nine 
affected states to ensure they received all the support they needed (Cooper and Block, 
2006:61). He also toured throughout all of the states, checking to see everything was 
working so that he was able to see what was needed first hand and make adjustments as 
necessary. If any problems persisted, he has able to call upon a factor that no other 
Director before or since has had: a direct line to the President. This was the significant 
difference between Andrew and Midwest/Northridge and one of the reasons why the FRP 
was a success with Lee Witt but not with his predecessor Stickney.
Clarify That:
One of the most crucial factors that led to FEMA’s success in both disasters was 
its ability to instil a consensus about role, and effective responsibility delegation 
(Hillyard, 2000:42). FEMA’s ability to coordinate and delegate roles made the response 
process more efficient and effective. In a Committee hearing after the events Lee Witt
stated that “it is absolutely critical that you look ... at your role and mission and redefine 
that role and mission to what you feel is important for that agency to be responsible for.” 
(Hearings 1994:197-198).
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The strategically closed structures allowed FEMA to be pragmatic at the onset of, 
or before, floods took hold, and then maintain a supportive role throughout the crisis. 
FEMA’s pragmatic involvement involved FEMA attempting to stay out of the disaster as 
much as possible except to provide logistical support and set up disaster centres. By 
doing this they allowed local and state units to initiate their own flood protocols and 
evacuation procedures. Each unit’s role was clarified, but not imposed, and moreover, it 
was made sure that objectives were achievable. Lee Witt argues that the resulting success 
was because “we were proactive...FEMA and the Federal Government did not wait to be 
called upon...we initiated contact, placed personnel, and worked hand-in-hand with our 
State counterparts in monitoring the situation, identifying needs, and delivering the 
required assistance” (Hearings 1994: 205). Broader affirmation of FEMA's success 
comes from the results of 5,000 surveys sent to flood victims one year after to ask them 
about the agency's performance (Franklin, 1995). More than 80 percent of the 
respondents approved of the way the agency was doing its job – a percentage that would 
have been unthinkable after Andrew or Katrina.
The closed framework allowed for FEMA to set the parameters for 
implementation around the FRP, but still left room for initiative to play an important role. 
The effective integration of California’s Standardized Emergency Management System 
(SEMS) with the FRP was a key component in the successful response to Northridge. 
SEMS does not require a government declaration in order to begin a response. As such, 
damage assessment teams were able to respond as soon as the earthquake ended and were 
quick to finish, taking only six hours (Bolin and Stanford 1998). While this was occurring 
Lee Witt contacted State officials and began converting the FEMA field office for use as 
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a command post. By playing a supportive role and delegating the technical roles to state 
actors, FEMA was able to be better prepared for the response and long-term relief efforts. 
Under a strategically closed framework, FEMA was able to deploy previously 
classified technologies in increasingly creative ways. Its transformation from Cold War 
relic to New Age Disaster Agency seemed almost complete. A crucial signal of FEMA’s 
metamorphosis was changing came when Lee Witt made resources available in natural 
disaster responses that had been accumulated in preparation for a Soviet attack. These 
technologies included the Mobile Emergency Response Support 6 (MERS) as 
communication platforms which were converted into mobile command centres and the 
Mount Weather Doomsday Shelter7 that was converted into a communications and unit-
dispatch centre (Cooper and Block, 2006:45). In doing so, one hundred FEMA disaster 
technology specialists were freed up to deal with natural catastrophes (Franklin, 1995).
Creative use of technology by transforming their military roles into disaster response
capacities made the spread of information, such as points of access and damage 
assessments, more widespread than during Andrew or Katrina. Both Lee Witt and Lt 
General Williams argued that this “new approach” was a key factor in “one of the most 
successful disaster responses” (Hearing, 1994:204)
                                                
6 MERS was a fleet of three hundred trucks that were mounted with electronic devices and would pick up 
senior officials in case of a nuclear attack. Cooper and Block (2006) estimated that these trucks cost the 
taxpayer $130 million a year. These would be de-classified under Lee Witt and turned into mobile 
communications platforms during The Midwest Floods and Northridge.
7 The Mount Weather centre was the main bunker being used to house senior government officials in the 
event of the terrorist or nuclear attack (Brinkley 2007: 150-51).
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Operational
Bending Over Backwards:
The operationally open framework allowed FEMA to inject more flexibility into 
the response. Local populations were enabled to improvise. Perhaps more than hurricanes 
and earthquakes, floods require another level of creative thinking and adaptability in
dealing with the disaster. For example, with normal modes of travel underwater in the 
Midwest, boats and canoes were used to ferry people across rivers, and pick up late 
evacuees. Moreover, it is important to note that although the economic impact is well 
documented, the flood had had a profound effect on transport, infrastructure, and social 
life. The flood paralyzed East-West transport by rail and road for over two months due to 
the large geographic area it covered (Franklin, 1995). It was clear to FEMA that the local 
population would be unable to rectify this on their own. The FRP allowed for enough 
variability in its implementation that open, local units from affected communities could 
be assisted by closed units, such as the Army.
The added flexibility also assisted during Northridge. FEMA believed that charity 
and aid organizations such as the Red Cross were in a better position to provide shelters 
because they were local and familiar with the location (Bolin and Stanford 1998). 
Consequently the Red Cross and churches had almost fifty emergency shelters and were 
able to house seven thousand people per night while FEMA provided blankets, water, and 
electricity generators as requested (ibid., 1998). FEMA’s ability to adapt the FRP to the 
circumstances meant that there was less duplication and confusion. Moreover, its ability 
to convert field offices into command (and request) posts ameliorated the unpredictability 
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of the earthquake. Good leadership and role clarity was enough to ensure the beginnings 
of a successful response.
FEMA quickly recognized that local personnel were being asked to respond in a 
“different mode from their daily routines” (Comfort 1994:162). The added operational 
flexibility and inter-operability between the FRP and SEMS meant that disaster experts 
from the strategic level could be integrated into operational units. The result was that
there was common training, shared disaster experience, and a base of common 
information between FEMA and the state responders throughout the Northridge response. 
The fact that the FRP and SEMS were compatible, meant that FEMA did not need to be 
able to predict where disaster struck, as it could in the Floods. Instead, if the state 
government requested additional personnel, FEMA was in a position to provide them. 
This was done with the knowledge that the operationally open framework would be 
flexible enough to accommodate strategic actors into operational units without 
complicating the process, as was the case during the Andrew response.
ACE in the Holes 
The FRP allowed FEMA to use the strengths and weaknesses of both open and 
closed operational units to its advantage. Closed units like the Army Corps of Engineers 
(ACE), were the primary military presence in the Floods. Under the flexibility of the 
open framework, the ACEs were able to implement their own flood control programs
which were designed to reduce the susceptibility of property to flood damage and relieve 
human and financial losses (Hearings 1995:184). The added flexibility meant the ACE 
was also authorized to perform emergency assistance work requested and funded by 
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FEMA, such as repairing and restoring flood control levees and supplying emergency 
clean water to communities (Waugh, 1999). 
Equally, the closed framework, wherein strict procedures for sandbagging and 
levee repair were enforced, meant that there was more consistency amongst the actions of 
the ACE, as opposed to the local communities. ACE suggested that their methods, which 
bolstered 157 of 193 levees resulted in the successful mitigation of over seven thousand 
million dollars in damage (Hearings, 1994:195-196). FEMA’s supportive role under the 
FRP allowed for both open and closed operational units to work independently, and to 
not have missions imposed upon from above.
A review of the operational response to the Floods highlights the fact that there 
were many different and diversely structured actors, with different roles and objectives. 
FEMA’s ability to predict where flood damage was likely to be most severe (by using 
“loss estimation satellites” originally designed to be used after nuclear attacks) meant that 
it could divert more of its resources to coordination (Tierney, 1995). Flood prone areas 
were well known and mapped out. As such, it was easier to predict where damage would
occur in a flood, than during an earthquake. However, although this predictability negates 
some of the time constraints that are present in earthquakes or hurricanes, the sheer scale 
of the number of actors and the geographic area of the disaster presents a major obstacle. 
FEMA’s ability to effectively deploy and coordinate personnel in nine different states 
was a phenomenal achievement, especially considering that only nine months before 
FEMA was unable to do so in a small area of South Florida.  
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Operational Tunnel Vision:
The short-sightedness of local response efforts was one problem that arose from 
the open framework. Californians were familiar with the reality of collapsed buildings 
during earthquakes being structurally unsound and needing to be demolished. However 
during the Floods, President Clinton considered proposals to convert entire towns and 
some large tracts of farmland to wetlands rather than rebuilding levees to protect them
(Schneider, 1993). The policy of “buying up towns” and “leasing some farmland” was a 
drastic change in flood mitigation policy which had relied heavily on repairing levees
after major floods. Largely due to their position away from the disaster and the 
consequent reduction in time pressures, strategic actors are able to have a more long-term 
response vision. This characteristic allowed Lee Witt to place more emphasis on 
mitigation. FEMA’s supportive role, along with its solitary response mission, allowed 
Lee Witt to design policy around “reactive mitigation”, clearing or bolstering defences of 
flood prone areas by retro-fitting houses for earthquakes.
Conclusion – Midwest and Northridge as Structural Success:
The successful response to the Midwest Floods and Northridge was due to the 
increased clarity of strategic and operational roles, experienced leadership and personnel 
at both operational and strategic levels, and the ability for the strategically closed actor, 
FEMA, to allow and encourage flexibility in operational units. The closed strategic and 
open operational frameworks enabled these characteristics. Implementing the FRP with 
only one strategic actor at the helm was the most significant and successful decision. Lee 
Witt stated that “the Federal Response Plan...worked [well] during the floods. The 
Federal Response Plan is a "living" document which is continually updated and expanded 
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based upon lessons learned from exercises and disasters... [i]t is not a detailed operations 
plan but, rather, a strategic plan in which Federal departments and agencies have 
identified critical areas of support that a State would likely require” (Hearings, 1994:213). 
Unlike Andrew or Katrina, the response to both disasters was not plagued with strategic 
actors failing to communicate or attempting to evade responsibility. A single hierarchy 
allowed FEMA to experiment with the FRP and give more discretionary powers to 
operational units such as field offices and local communities.
Success also lay in focused leadership within the uncomplicated strategic 
framework. By the provision of a Cabinet position and a direct line from the President to 
the Director, FEMA was able to better adapt the FRP to suit each disaster. Republican 
Daniel Inhofe stated that “I haven't spent a lot of time complimenting the President on his 
appointments but I sure did on this one” (Cooper and Block 2006:60). Experience and 
leadership were important, but the key factor for success was the uncomplicated strategic 
framework which enabled it.
The framework was successful because each actor knew what was required of 
them. The closed strategic framework meant that there were less instances of confusion 
over who was in charge and as a result information, requests, and orders flowed between 
strategic and operational levels more effectively. Due to the scale of the Floods, and the 
suddenness of Northridge, the operationally open framework encouraged units to adapt 
their own plans to the conditions at the grassroots level, instead of having a top-down 
plan imposed upon them. This combination was a major factor in the successful 
responses to the Floods and Northridge.
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Conclusion – The Keys to Success
The fact that successful responses have largely been ignored in the literature 
makes studying them all the more important. Comparisons between successful responses 
and their failed counterparts provide a more holistic view of disaster management than 
simply looking at what went wrong. Clearly there is no single factor that separates a 
successful response from a failed one. Many factors combined to make the responses to 
the Midwest and Northridge effective. The most vital were strong, experienced leadership, 
autonomy, and mission clarity. While individual factors stopped paralysis at the strategic 
level and assisted in responsibility delegation, it was the overall framework that enabled 
the operational and strategic actors in the response. I argue that the strategically closed 
and operationally open framework was appropriate for the Midwest and Northridge 
responses. The closed strategic actor, FEMA, was able to successfully delegate both 
responsibilities and resources by taking a proactive stance within the disaster and fixing
problems before or as they occurred. Simultaneously, the operationally open structure 
stayed on the “edge of chaos” (Kauffman 1993) by adapting to the specific contexts and 
recognizing when assistance needed from strategic actors. Experienced personnel, 
information sharing, and strong leadership at both levels combined with the framework to 
produce two successful responses that proved that FEMA’s revival after Andrew was no 
mirage.
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Chapter Six – Conclusion
Everything is (Not) Broken
Open and closed frameworks are an effective means of analysing disaster 
management structures. However, I have argued that the binary application of these is 
flawed. The first major concern is that the literature is too heavily focused on analysing 
failures at the expense of successes. This practice ignores over half the disaster 
management picture and restricts the discussion to “what went wrong” instead of “what 
went right”. Unlike failures, successful disaster responses demonstrate effective 
coordination and cooperation. 
There is also a misguided assumption within the literature that disaster responses
are either wholly open or closed. Disaster organizations and their responses are never 
wholly open or closed but rather a combination of both. In order to better examine where 
“balance” is best realized, it is necessary to disaggregate the disaster organizations into 
their strategic and operational components. The strategically closed and operationally 
open framework is the most effective in disasters because it enables strong leadership and 
allows for effective communication of missions and objectives in the disaster responses 
studied here. Strategically closed actors are able to be more proactive and decisive than 
their open counterparts. Concurrently, operationally open actors are in a better position to 
adapt to new conditions and missions that arose throughout the responses.
On the other hand, a strategically open and operationally closed framework is 
inappropriate for responses. Confusion, evasion, and isolation are more likely under this 
framework because communicating between multiple strategic actors is difficult. When 
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strategic actors have their own objectives, roles, and missions and cannot communicate 
effectively with operational units the result is overlaps, duplication and ultimately sub-
optimal responses.
Two other factors reveal themselves to be invaluable throughout all disaster 
responses: clarity and leadership. Clarity of missions, functions, and roles is vital to the 
success of a response. Effective communication, both before and after the response, is 
needed to increase the probability of success. Lee Witt’s daily meetings with operational 
officials and his creative use of civil defence technology for command purposes in the 
Midwest Floods and Northridge were two elements that were noticeably absent during 
Andrew and Katrina.
Equally, strong leadership is the other factor that has a positive effect on
responses. The ability of a single leader to organize and coordinate a response cannot be 
understated. When too many strategic actors are involved, confusion and evasion are sure 
to follow. Lee Witt’s ability to command from the top-down, and also allow his 
operational units to adapt and work from the bottom-up, is a major difference between 
the successful responses to the Midwest and Northridge contrasting with Andrew and 
Katrina.
Future Directions
There are a number of aspects on the periphery of my thesis that require further 
research. First, an examination of the efficacy of placing political appointees in positions 
of power is needed. A solid answer as to whether the practice is positive or detrimental is 
inconclusive without examining failed appointees, such as Stickney, successful 
appointees like Lee Witt, and appointees like Brown, who shared Lee Witt’s beliefs on 
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mitigation and attempted to progress the idea further, but because of a lack of autonomy 
and access, was unable to operationalize his plans. To what extent does the 
professionalization of disaster management affect FEMA’s position in the departmental 
hierarchy, its constitution of personnel, and its unique combination of open and closed 
structures?
Although I have demonstrated that FEMA changed through the seventeen year 
period from 1992 to 2005, a more in-depth study into FEMA’s learning mechanisms is 
needed. Why did FEMA appear to learn the “right” lessons from Andrew and not use 
these again in the Katrina response? Meyer and Rowen (1977) also encourage academics 
to reflect on the influence of leadership and personnel structures within large institutions. 
Their focus on the struggle to gain internal legitimacy posits that organizations may 
become internally fractured and ultimately ‘decoupled’ from the reality they are expected 
to address. This will have interesting implications for disaster management study: Does 
the “downtime” between disasters, rather than representing a period of consolidation and 
learning, in fact become a time of internal power struggles and disintegration without a 
focussing point – an external crisis – to provide legitimacy?
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